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Usable Science 8: Early Warning Systems: Do's and Don'ts Report of Workshop 20-23 October 2003
Report prepared by Michael H. Glantz 6 February 2004 |
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A workshop was organized in Shanghai, China, from 20-23 October 2003 on the topic of "Early Warning Systems: Do's and Don'ts." It was sponsored by the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), the US National Science Foundation (NSF), the China Meteorological Administration's Academy of Meteorological Science (CAMS), and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The focus of the workshop discussion was centered primarily around research activities and experiences with hydrological and meteorological hazards and warning systems designed to alert at-risk people, communities, and governments about the possible onset of those hazards and impacts of hazards. Participants represented a wide range of disciplines, countries, and professions in order to address the success and limitations of early warning systems in general. A representative of the second Early Warning System Conference (EWC II), held 16-18 October 2003 in Bonn presented the findings of that major international conference. More than a score of questions about early warnings and early warning systems were presented for discussion (please refer to the Viewbook in Appendix 5). The workshop participants were in plenary sessions except for a breakout session in which they divided into three groups to undertake a preliminary review to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints of early warning systems. One group focused on "selecting and monitoring indicators." A second group focused on "communicating the warning," while a third group was asked to focus on issues relating to "receiving, believing, and acting on the warning." Some key observations of the groups are presented in charts. This workshop was convened (by chance and not by design) ten years, almost to the day, from the first Usable Science workshop. That workshop focused on "The use of El Niño information in famine early warning in sub-Saharan Africa" (Glantz, 1994). Interest in early warning of all kinds of traditional, natural, and anthropogenic hazards has grown markedly over the years, as new hazards arise and as known hazards continue to plague societies worldwide. Newly identified hazards and known hazards appearing in new places include global warming, solar wind storms, SARS, West Nile virus, hantavirus, mad cow disease, wasting disease, global terrorism, and so on. Societies must remain on the alert and early warning systems provide them with one way to remain vigilant. An objective of this Usable Science Workshop on Early Warning Systems has been to identify lessons - in short, do's and don'ts - from the experiences of those who have worked with or helped to develop early warning systems for a wide range of societal concerns. It was hoped that the lessons, experiences, and insights identified in the workshop discussions could be used to remind, if not inform, government officials as well as decision makers in various government agencies and nongovernmental organizations about how to prepare effective warnings. They would also be used to educate the media and the general public about how to interpret and use such warnings. We will have succeeded if we help to find ways to make early warnings of potential "threats" to society and the environment more useful, credible, and reliable. There are many early warning systems (EWSs) in operation today in every country, if not in every community. In this report, we focus primarily, but not exclusively, on those systems related to hydrometeorological anomalies. Governments maintain early warning systems to warn their citizens and themselves about, for example, impending climate- and weather-related hazards. While there are early warnings and early warning systems for just about everything that a government, society, individual, or corporation might want to know about the future, many of those warnings are not as effective as they could (or should) be. There is no perfect EWS, except on paper, in governmental plans, or in a PowerPoint presentation. While warning systems look great on paper as organization charts or as input-output diagrams, they run into difficulties (bottlenecks) at various locations (nodes and arrows) in the flow of warning preparation to communication and to action. It is useful to start discussions about EWSs with the view that there is no perfect system, so that expectations about what an EWS can do for its users remain at a realistic, as opposed to hypothetical, level. Even with a highly effective EW, it is reasonable to expect that problems will still arise in the hazard-affected region, so past experience should be included in any EWS. To be sure, there are conflicting views at just about every stage of an EW process that will tend to reduce the effectiveness of a warning. However, not all delays in response to a warning are the result of a conspiracy or a bureaucratic tendency toward inaction. Several honest scientific disagreements exist about, for example, what an EWS should do for a government or a society and, often, about what qualitative or quantitative data mean. In addition, one officially designated early warning cannot meet all societal needs. Often one EWS's output serves as input to another EWS downstream. A cascade of early warnings has been set into motion. At various downstream stages of the EW process, there will be room for delayed responses. Attached to this report in the appendix are the findings and recommendations of three recent (1998, 2002, 2003) international conferences on early warning systems. It is important to point out that at every stage in the early warning process, there will be ethical and equity issues that must be addressed. Several of these issues appear throughout the text. The following selected highlights are noted in bulleted format. They are not presented in a specific order of importance but illustrate the kinds of points identified as worthy of attention by policy makers who want to assure that early warning systems are effective in achieving their goals. |
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Hazards and disasters, as well as response mechanisms, cut across many space and time scales, as does vulnerability. In addition, hazards and threats can change over time not only in intensity, frequency, and in location and duration, but also in importance and interest, as does vulnerability. Societies have learned to cope with some hazards, while other hazards continue to cause problems whenever they occur. New hazards are occasionally recognized as new information becomes available. For example, we now know that droughts occur in distant parts of the globe during El Niño episodes. This new knowledge was not really uncovered until the late 1960s and was not really used in decision making until the late 1970s. Disparate regions that had been plagued by drought for unknown reasons learned that many of their droughts could be convincingly related to increases in sea surface temperature in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific (El Niño), or to changes in sea level pressure across the Pacific basin (Southern Oscillation). Other examples of newer hazards include the SARS virus outbreak and the appearance of mad cow disease. Keep in mind that hazards can either be quick-onset or slow-onset (long-term, low-grade and cumulative). Those affected by hazards can also be far removed from the disaster site and not just in the disaster zone. Hazards are often blamed for damages that in fact may have resulted from other factors, such as technological or demographic changes, i.e., vulnerability. Some hazards are recurrent in a given area, some are occasional, and others are rare and unexpected. For some hazards there is skill for issuing warnings and for others there is little skill. Note that even the same hazard of the same intensity and seasonal timing in the same location can cause different consequences, depending on the changes in society that had occurred in the interim period, i.e., changes in societal vulnerability. Because hazard impacts are integrally linked to vulnerability, one could ask if there should be an EWS for vulnerability and vulnerability changes.
Schematic illustration of the science, technology, and fundamental knowledge needed for a risk assessment (Hays, 1999). |
The psychological aspects surrounding EWSs are much more important than may generally be realized. The way that people view early warning systems will affect how effective the EWS might prove to be. For example, people will need to trust their EWS and the purveyors of warnings, if they are to be expected to act on its warnings. That is why it is important to keep politics to a minimum in an EWS's operations. It is also why there must be as much transparency as possible in the decision making process that leads to warnings. Because perceptions do not always match reality, there is a need to pay attention to the reasons behind the gap. When an EWS is created, it also generates along with it high, often unrealistic, expectations and sometimes a false sense of security. This could lead a society to lower its guard against a hazard. Making this situation more difficult is an expectation that it is the government's job to protect its citizens from harms, especially harms linked to nature. This too could prompt a population to relax its self-protection mechanisms. It is important for the public as well as for the EWS to be aware of the limits of an EWS so that expectations about what it can do more closely approximate reality. Another aspect of perception is that people tend to discount the past; that is, they put less value on information about experiences of previous governments and previous generations than they place on the information that is collected in the present. Discounting the value of information has a negative effect on the many lessons identified from the impacts of previous hazards and disasters. This is in part the result of a belief that new technologies will change in a positive way the ability of society today to respond to an early warning of a potential hazard. It is in part the result of a belief that the current generation is more knowledgeable than previous ones. In most societies, there are options available to the at-risk populations, once they have received a warning of the likely onset of a hazard. People then have the choice to believe the warning of the event and take appropriate evasive action or to believe that they are not really in harm's way and take no preventive measure. While perceptions of reality may not accurately reflect reality, the actions taken based on those perceptions will have real consequences.
In addition to issuing general warnings to the public at large about the potential onset of a hazard, warnings designed for the special needs of specific users must be prepared, because different communities that are in need of early warning about potential hazards have different information needs. This includes those directly and indirectly affected by the hazard, which could occur sequentially or conjunctively, as well as those who are at risk to the second- and third-order impacts. There are also humanitarian and non-governmental organizations that must be informed as soon as possible, so that they can prepare their activities for the disaster and post-disaster reconstruction phases. Although some people will respond immediately to a warning, others will choose not to take heed of the warning. They might, for example, see themselves as being outside the at-risk circle of people for whom that warning was meant. They may also be risk takers, or they may not have confidence in the system that produced the warning. It is important to involve stakeholders in early warning early in the development and review of a warning system. Stakeholders can provide important insights into how warnings might best be prepared and delivered to the public, the media, and even to the governments at different levels. They will also feel a sense of ownership in the system that is supposed to warn them and, as a result, warnings will take on a higher level of credibility and reliability. Stakeholders are not expected to be passively involved in the early warning process. As Mileti noted in a reassessment of natural hazards in the United States, "All stakeholders in a community need to be brought to the point of taking responsibility for recognizing their locale's environmental resources and the environmental hazards to which it is prone" (Mileti, 1999, p. 268).
All societies are affected by natural and anthropogenic hazards of one kind or another. One of the goals of scientific and social research should be to understand more correctly the various ways that hazards can affect society, the ways that societies contribute to the impacts of those hazards on society and the environment, and the reasons that many but not all hazards become disasters. With regard to geological hazards (earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis) and with hydro-meteorological hazards (droughts, floods, frosts), the physical processes are either well understood or are under close scrutiny by scientific researchers. With regard to socioeconomic and political processes, there is a heightened need to understand their roles in the conversion of a potential hazard into an actual disaster with loss of human life. Armed with physical, cultural, and socioeconomic information, it is increasingly possible for a society to convert its "culture of disaster" into a "culture of disaster prevention." According to one participant, a culture of prevention would be based on early warning and pro-action where possible, reaction and adaptation when necessary, and societal resilience all the time. Such knowledge can help societies and their government representatives to avoid backing their way into future disasters as opposed to using foresight to prepare for them. The impacts of hazards need not be surprising, if the appropriate warning mechanisms are in place. There are processes under way in a society at the time of a hazard that can either mitigate or exacerbate the hazard's impacts on society and the environment. Is it the responsibility of a hazards-related early warning system to monitor a society's underlying social, cultural, economic and political conditions in order to better warn at-risk populations? If not, whose responsibility is it? Clearly, it is essential to identify societal processes that can affect the impacts of hazards (quick onset and creeping), so that governments and individuals can better warn about and prepare for likely impacts. It is most likely the responsibility of the various ministries and specialized governmental and non-governmental agencies to monitor these underlying processes and to report periodically to the early warning system on the status of the processes. Each government has the responsibility to identify what it is that makes societies more or less vulnerable and more or less resilient. For example, rapid social, economic and political change can increase vulnerability. Societies not only have difficulty coping with many new issues but are continually having to cope with recurrent problems. Early warning of hazards combined with the early warnings of underlying societal problems and processes can lead to a strengthening of resilience and a reduction in vulnerability. The combination of social changes with the occurrence of natural hazards requires periodic objective review. A common belief is that developing countries are more vulnerable and less resilient to hazards than are industrialized countries. However, this belief would benefit from closer scrutiny. Industrialized countries have the economic resources to respond to hazard warnings and to rebuild after a disaster, but they also have a lower level of tolerance for inconvenience than the developing countries, a lower threshold for collective pain. So, the concept of vulnerability should be broadened beyond a traditional view to include more than a consideration of death and destruction of property. How well prepared a society is in order to be proactive in the face of early warning of a looming hazard determines how well people might respond to the hazard. This could be considered an aspect of societal resilience. It could be used to measure the level of awareness and resilience of a society as well as the level of effectiveness of its early warning system. It is important to note that a SWOC assessment can be undertaken (i.e., identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and constraints) for early warning systems in order to provide insights in general (see section on SWOC). However, the findings of such assessments will likely vary greatly from one specific EWS to another, and perhaps even for the same EWS at different times. All the points in this section so far relate to climate variability and extremes. However, global and regional climate regimes are constantly changing on all time scales. Today, there is great concern from a large number of scientists from around the globe that the global climate regime is warming up to levels not seen in tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of years. Climate change will bring about changes in the frequency, intensity, duration and location of extreme events, adding to the list of yet-unknown underlying processes that can affect hazards and societal vulnerability to them. Hurricane Mitch provides a relevant but unfortunate example of how underlying socioeconomic and political problems can make a bad hazard-related situation even worse. In late October 1998, Hurricane Mitch had been downgraded to a tropical depression when it did its worst damage to Honduras. The slow-moving tropical system dumped many inches of rainfall on hillsides, towns and cities and caused destructive mudslides and flooding. It was estimated that about 80 percent of the country's infrastructure had been damaged and more than 10,000 people perished. At the time of Mitch, Honduras was ranked as the fourth poorest country in Latin America. Out of the memory of most people at that time, and even today, is the fact that, 25 years earlier and almost to the month, Hurricane Fifi caused comparable levels of death and destruction. One can only wonder what the impacts might have been had lessons learned in Hurricane Fifi been applied in the decades before the impacts of Hurricane Mitch (Glantz and Jamieson, 2000).
There are many EWSs in a given country at any point in time, several of which are likely to be focusing on the same or related issues. For example, a concern for food security generates climate forecasts, agricultural production assessments, water resources projections, household food security reviews and nutritional status reports. Even among food security EWSs, there are likely to be several NGO-operated EWSs for one or another aspect of food security. They do not necessarily measure the same indicators nor do they work closely together. Is the existence of a number of EWSs (formal and informal) a hindrance to effective warnings being issued and heeded? Or, is the opposite valid, that is, having numerous warning systems that can serve to check and balance each other so that only real emergencies are identified when several of the EWSs, using their chosen sets of indicators, yield similar warnings. This point remains controversial: are many EWSs operating at the same time better than having just one officially designated system operating at a given time?
The issue of accountability of EWS personnel for the warnings that they issue (or fail to issue) always seems to arise in discussions. What if the warning is wrong? An erroneous warning about a hazard can cause serious socioeconomic problems, because governments need to respond by shifting some of their scarce resources away from economic development activities to disaster response. With a forecast of severe drought or a strong El Niño, financial institutions have been known to hold back on loans and investments to those at risk to the impacts of a hazard in given regions and sectors (e.g., farmers, fishermen). Not issuing a warning also prompts different types of responses. What if they warn about an event that does not occur or its intensity and damage is not as bad as suggested by the EWS; who, if anyone, should bear the blame? Like weather forecasting, it seems that EWSs are more likely to receive blame for missed or erroneous warnings than praise for successful ones. The following expression could apply: "Victory and success have many fathers. Failure is an orphan." However, when a formal EWS is in operation, failure can be attributed to an organization, a process, or even an individual. There are several examples where political leaders and heads of forecasting units have been removed from office because of inappropriate warnings or poor responses to legitimate warnings. While there is a notion about pollution that the "polluter pays" for damages, there is no comparable notion for those who provide inadequate, untimely, or erroneous public warnings about hazards of concern.
The notion of foreseeability was discussed about whether it has any value in early warnings. It is a notion taken from the law profession. Foreseeability is viewed here as a qualitative expression of probability. It has been used in law to determine accountability or fault in the case of an accident. If it is reasonable to expect that there are likely to be adverse consequences of a natural hazard's intersection with human activities in a given area and no steps are taken to minimize those impacts, should those with decision-making responsibilities be accountable for the damages that ensue? With respect to early warning systems accountability is not the primary purpose for using foreseeability; it provides an early qualitative expression of possible concern about a hazard's possible impacts. One participant noted, "Most hazards are foreseeable. Everything that has happened in the past is foreseeable." The impacts of disasters, however, are different and in many instances are related as much to the level of societal vulnerability as to the intensity of the hazard. A recent example using foreseeability in early warning took place in mid-2002. Political changes in land use in Zimbabwe, coupled with electoral irregularities, suggested that, for the short term at least, food production would likely decline. Complicating this basic scenario was the forecast of the onset of an El Niño event later in the year, during the growing season, and continuing into the following year. There is a high probability of drought in southern Africa when an El Niño occurs. Putting the pieces of this puzzle together, one could foresee the possibility of severe food shortages not only in Zimbabwe but also in countries in the region dependent on Zimbabwe's food exports. Foreseeability could be used as an educational tool for those operating early warning systems, even if it is not used in an operational way. In support of the view that there should be multiple expressions of a warning, foreseeability can be viewed as yet another way to express an early warning of potential harm. The vital question though is how to get decision makers to act on qualitative expressions of probability such as a statement of foreseeability. The same concerns can be raised for the "precautionary principle." The precautionary principle is like a very conservative early warning. Its objective is to "do no harm" when making decisions for which scientific uncertainty remains a significant factor. Opposing groups focused on the same issue play upon scientific uncertainty (Martin, 1979). One group might conclude that there is too much scientific uncertainty to take a chance that actions will lead to irreversible damage to the environment and in turn to society. An opposing group might argue that there is no conclusive evidence (beyond a reasonable doubt) about potential irreversible damage that should merit the blocking of human activities in certain fragile environments. In a way, the confusion is the same that is created by two opposing adages: "look before you leap" and "he who hesitates is lost." Either adage is important in specific situations, and both are useful generalizations, but neither of them will work in all situations. Like the adages and the metaphors that people live by, the precautionary principle has value if it makes decision makers pause to think before they decide. It is difficult to apply the precautionary principle in specific situations but, when doing so, the pro and con of actions should be made explicit and weighed against each other. To developing countries, or developing regions within a country, the precautionary principle may be seen as a luxury because they have more urgent development priorities. For example, they point to industrialized countries noting that before they developed a great concern for environmental protection, they first exploited their environments and resources to the fullest. Once developed, the industrialized countries were able to turn their attention toward environmental restoration. Industrializing countries do better than the industrialized countries. No set development pathway is inevitable. We can learn from our mistakes, do better, and achieve development more quickly, more easily, and more efficiently than before, while reducing the detrimental impacts. The problem is, however, that history shows that environmental degradation can heighten the level of vulnerability to hydro-meteorological and other hazards. So, is "an ounce of prevention really worth a pound of cure," as the saying goes? Such issues may not be resolved nor resolvable; such questions may not be answered nor answerable. Discussing them and ensuring that people are aware of the issues and debates can, in many situations, be as important as reaching definitive conclusions, without such awareness.
Much of what is written in this report about EWSs has to do with government type, structure, function, policy, and politics. A few points deserve additional attention. In theory at least, governments acknowledge that they have a responsibility to warn about natural hazard risks that affect their populations. Yet bureaucratic units within governments have their own constraints to contend with, and those constraints can influence the use, effectiveness, and value of an EWS. For example, often within a bureaucracy there is competition among various units for information ("information is power"), funding, or political influence. As a result, the timely sharing of information of interest to several other units might take place slowly, if it takes place at all. Some bureaucratic units may play upon the warnings of a potential disaster in order to gain advantage over other units involved in early warnings. Keep in mind that a hidden objective is likely to be driven by the belief that "the first in time is the first to be served." If a warning is issued by one unit, it will likely set into motion other EWSs concerned with downstream impacts of a particular hazard (second- and third-order effects). Those who are the first to warn (and are later proven to have been correct) are likely to receive increased political attention and funding from the government. As noted earlier, some governments may set up warning systems in order to keep themselves, and not necessarily the general public, informed of the potential onset of hazards. They, then, have the option to expose or not to expose a warning to the public (via the media). Governments support EWSs and can, if they so desire, influence for political as opposed to humanitarian reasons EWS outputs, unless measures are taken to avoid such a scenario.
Lessons are learned with respect to early warning systems, their warnings, and the impacts of hazards. However, those lessons are not always applied when it comes to future hazards. Lessons learned as a result of disasters come with a high cost --- death, destruction and misery. The survivors of the impacts of hazards and disasters are the beneficiaries of those lessons, but only if those lessons are applied. It is important to identify and then apply lessons so that the victims in previous disasters do not become victims without a legacy. There are many reasons that lessons identified as a result of one hazard are not used when seeking to cope with similar hazards in the future. Perhaps one key aspect about lessons that needs to be highlighted is that the value of many of the lessons that had been identified in the past are discounted because society believes that progress (technological, economic and social) have rendered them no longer relevant today. Lessons identified in the past may also have limited value because society's level of vulnerability may have changed over time, making the lessons appear to be less meaningful. It is not clear at this time about the extent to which EWSs share their experiences in detail greater than making overviews of presentations at conferences. It is clear that EWS experiences in one culture, country or political system cannot be directly applied to other countries, even those countries that are facing similar types of hazards. Nevertheless, benefits can be derived from assessing the structures, functions, modus operandi, and impacts of EWSs in other places. It would be useful to collect lessons of the past for evaluation by present and future EWSs. A political aspect related to lessons is that democratic as well as other kinds of changes in government can lead the new administration to neglect or to rescind the useful hazard-related activities that had been established by the preceding government. This can happen when a political party gains power and replaces another. In addition, a current government would be more willing to expose the weaknesses and failures of an EWS and the responses to a hazard of its predecessors than to expose the same problems in its own government. Some governments might not want lessons to be identified and then exposed to the public. Such lessons can expose governmental weaknesses, as well as strengths. While the government itself might like to know about its hazard response weaknesses, it may not want to share that information with the public, the media, or its opponents. Sometimes governments over-react to a disaster and set up a structure and warning system to cope with similar disasters in the future, even though the type of hazard of concern might be highly infrequent, even rare from a societal perspective. For example, in 1960 there was a red locust invasion and in response to its damage, a red locust-monitoring center was established. However, the red locust threat had not yet returned - in four decades, until its recent appearance in the late 1990s in southern Africa (Price and Brown, 2000). As noted earlier, a hazard's frequency has an influence on the use of an EWS. For example, if a hazard's warning level remains the same over a long period of time, as with the US homeland terror security system (predominantly yellow) or with volcano warning in parts of Mexico, which has been at yellow for years, the public will over time likely disregard it. There is a tendency for a government or a society to focus on and respond to the last disaster instead of taking a broader view of hazards in general. As a result, they tend to pursue policies that look back as opposed to those that might be forward looking and anticipatory of variations in impacts that might accompany future potential harms.
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Disasters get the lion's share of attention from the media when compared with "ordinary" adverse impacts that might result from climate variability from season to season and year to year. Clearly, disasters are newsworthy and the media do take notice. Governments, too, take notice of disasters, as do insurance companies, among others. Each of the aforementioned takes notice, but it does so for different reasons. Yet, with some notable exceptions, disasters do not impact the same location repeatedly. However, the impacts on human activities of variability are occurring all the time. Collectively, the low-frequency hazards (such as those related to hydrometeorological anomalies) are probably more costly cumulatively over the long run than a higher-visibility disaster. Who, then, decides when a disaster has occurred? Sometimes it is the media, or the government, or an insurance (more correctly, reinsurance) company that labels disasters as such. Insurance companies report on their payouts to disasters and each year they publish lists of such events. However, using their own set of indicators, the reinsurance companies determine which disasters to put on their lists. Some of those disasters might not make it to the disaster lists that are compiled by others. As noted earlier, Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras when it had already weakened to become a tropical depression, it was not at the time a hurricane. Each country has to cope with its own set of hazards. Funds are scarce in most countries and diverting funds for the setting up of formal early warning systems can be a difficult political decision. How are they to prioritize which ones they are to focus on? El Niño is seen as a generator of hazards in Australia and Peru, but La Niña is not, even though both hazards can be associated with adverse impacts on these societies. In the US, the homeland security warning system uses 5 colors that correspond to levels of threat. The colors range from blue (no threat), green, yellow (elevated threat), orange and red (the highest threat). It is pretty obvious that blue will never be used. In mid-2003, the Department of Homeland Security elevated its warning from yellow to orange. It was most likely issued for such high-visibility locations such as major cities on the east and west coasts. People in various parts of the interior of the country, however, were not convinced that the threat in their location merited such an elevated warning level. For example, a sheriff in the southwestern state of Arizona referred to the warning as "orange lite," meaning that the threat was not real in his jurisdiction (USA Today, 2003). So there is clearly a spatial dimension to the risk of hazards and disasters.
Disaster priorities in a given location will likely vary over time as new hazards appear, as old forgotten hazards reappear, and as existing hazards known to inhabitants of one region appear in new unsuspecting areas. SARS in China is one example. West Nile virus in the US is another example. A deadly heat wave in France is yet another example. Each of these unexpected health disasters took place in 2003. A final note in this section refers to creeping environmental changes. Because they do not have readily identifiable step-like thresholds of change, it is more difficult to label them as disasters until they have reached a perceived crisis stage. Nevertheless, they are disasters in the offing and need to be recognized as such, so that timely and effective decisions can be made to arrest them.
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Early Warning Systems and Uncertainty
Hazard warnings are accompanied by various scientific uncertainties about their timing of onset, magnitude and destructive potential (hazards usually expose societal weaknesses that remain hidden under 'normal' conditions). One might think that the earlier the warning the greater the uncertainty. That may be true for insight about the onset of the hazard, but may not be true for the other factors (intensity, damage, for example). Uncertainty is often expressed by forecasters in terms of probabilities. However, it appears that the public as well as policy makers have a difficult time understanding probabilities. In fact, many scientists have such difficulties too. While the public might not understand probabilities when expressed quantitatively, they do understand what it means to "take a chance" or to "take risks." For example, farmers in many countries hedge against hydro-meteorological problems by growing different kinds of crops in various locations or by using irrigation. As another example, people take chances every day, even though they do not know how to express those chances in probabilistic terms. For some reason, decision makers demand near certainty when it comes to early warnings, even though they make decisions every day with much less than perfect information at hand. They, too, like farmers, know how to "hedge their bets." Nevertheless, even with highly certain information in hand, some people and governments will still fail to take the best actions for their own well-being. Thus, there will still be risk-informed death and destruction because of hazards. There are varying interpretations of probability statements. Quantitative expressions of probability are influenced by perceptions and, therefore, do not necessarily match what people believe are equivalent to verbal expressions. This is generally true within a given country or culture, as suggested by the following chart (Fischhoff, 1994), and even more so when discussing probabilities across cultures.
Climate change (i.e., global warming) in the past several decades is a known fact. What is not known, however, is the degree of increase in global temperature in the 20th century that has been caused by human activities. So, it is difficult to make truly reliable quantitative expressions of probability of occurrence for the wide range of expected impacts of climate change. Warnings about the consequences of global warming will test the ability of climate change-related EWSs to maintain their credibility, because the uncertainties surrounding the consequences are quite large. The IPCC (2001) report provided charts showing the expected likelihood of occurrence of certain global warming impacts in general and for specific regions. The global climate regime is constantly changing. This provides another reason why early warning systems, especially their indicators for the hazards of concern and for the hazards suggested in global warming studies, need to undergo constant scrutiny and updating. Even though there is uncertainty in the science and impacts of global warming, there are many actions that societies can take to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. There are also actions that can be taken to reduce societal vulnerability to the hypothesized changes in regional and local climates, changes such as more intense storms, longer duration of droughts, increased intensity of precipitation, intense and frequent heat waves, and so forth. When the EWS's technical core group issues a warning, it often sets in motion other early warning systems related to anticipated downstream or second-order effects of the impacts. Those downstream warning systems identify risks to environmental processes and to human activities. There are several examples of this cascade. Because El Niño spawns droughts and floods around the globe, it may be the earliest warning possible about hydrometeorological hazards that a government might receive. The forecast of an El Niño will in essence set off a cascade of early warnings downstream. As a result, this information becomes input into other warning systems.
In addition to this El Niño cascade, there are other examples: El Niño and the ice storm in Quebec in January 1998; The demise of the Aral Sea in the second half of the 20th century; variations in the level of the Caspian Sea since 1930; and so forth. The recent heat wave in Europe, and specifically in France, had apparently been forecast by various national meteorological services. Whether timely, effective warnings had been issued to the populace requires closer scrutiny. It does appear, though, that no apparent cascade of early warnings was set in motion following the reliable forecast of a protracted high heat period on the continent. Officially, about 15,000 people perished in France. The disaster in France did serve to prompt other European governments (e.g., Spain) to take precautionary actions in order to avoid a repeat of the disastrous French experience. As one participant noted, "something obviously went wrong" with the cascade that should have taken place once the forecasts of excessive heat were issued. Early warning systems provide outlooks as well as higher levels of warning. They have an important contribution to make by "warning" that normal conditions are likely to prevail. Positive news would also set off a cascade of downstream warnings and outlooks for the second-order impacts of normal conditions, e.g., a low probability of an onset of a hazard. |
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August 2003 Heat Wave in France During the first fortnight of August 2003, a severe heat wave affected most of Europe, with a number of consequences on water availability, energy supply (in Italy, for instance), a significant increase in forest fires (Portugal), and atmospheric pollution (Belgium) [10]. But nowhere was the impact as dramatic as in France where the morality increased 55% nationwide, and as much as 221% in the area of Paris. More than 80% of the affected people were older than 75, and 64% were women [12]. About half the deaths occurred in homes for the elderly [11] in a country that spends 9.5% of its GNP on public health. Excess deaths amounted to almost 15,000 [7,9]; early reactions saw the explanation of this "deadliest summer since liberation in 1945" [3] in a combination of exceptionally high temperatures coupled with the fact that most people were on vacation: hospitals were understaffed, with as much as 30% of staff missing in some hospitals [11]. On 11 August, first reports in the press indicated the "saturation of funeral parlors" and the fear that "several hundreds of deaths" may have occurred [5]. The editorial of the 13 August issue of Le Monde (the leading Paris-based newspaper) was entitled Nonchalance. It started by stating that "Siesta is a traditional way to conserve energy in warm climates" but then continued by asking, "but can it replace a method of government?" [8] Indeed, as early as 9-10 August, informed individuals such as physicians, tried to raise the alarm by talking to the media. However, the reaction of official health and emergency structures was very slow; they mainly include the National Institute of Public Health Surveillance (Institute de Veille Sanitaire, IVS) and the General Bureau of Health (Direction Générale de la Santé, DGS) [9]. The National Assembly established the Commission d'Enquête on 7 October 2003 to inquire into the causes of the disaster caused by the heat wave. It appears that not only had warning systems failed, but on 8 August the Prefect of Police, Paris, instructed the Fire Brigades "not to be alarmist and not to disclose the number of deaths" in testimony by Jacques Kerdoncuff, Commander of the Paris Fire Brigade, before the Commission on 5 November [5]. What went wrong? The early analyses blaming the problem on the vacations of medical staff are obviously simplistic. In fact, this simplistic analysis may have contributed to the disaster, as the first difficulties of emergency structures in handling the situation were interpreted as a deficiency of those structures, rather than a sign of a serious emergency. Standard administrative procedures were followed because the epidemic nature of the problem was not first recognized [6]. Lessons from the heat wave include the need to improve the coordination of data analysis. In France, epidemiological and health data collection systems are partitioned between police authorities, army, fire brigades, health institutions, and National Security, among others [1]. This was admitted by Mr Jean-Paul Proust, the Prefect of Police, on 29 October before the Commission d'Enquête: "there has been insufficiency cross-checking of information" [2]. Another lessons is that institutional links between health (and food safety) and environmental monitoring need strengthening; conflicts of competence systematically arise whenever environmentally triggered health or food safety problems appear, as when oysters were recently contaminated by oil slicks from the Erika [6]. This particular point was duly taken into consideration by the €9 billion plan announced on 6 November by the Prime Minister, Mr Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in favor of old and disabled people [6], as there is currently no formal link between the National Meteorological Service (MeteoFrance) and the mostly disease-oriented health system.
The absence of adequate analysis of meteorological data is patent in the report published by IVS in late August 2003 [12]. Many illustrations show profiles of raw weather data (minimum and maximum temperatures), but no attention is given to moisture and other variables (e.g., ozone concentrations), which very much aggravate stress and the physiological effects of temperatures. It is also worth noting that the dossier prepared by MeteoFrance on the heat wave describes only the behavior of different variables in isolation, mainly temperatures [14]. A number of monitoring tools (indices) has been derived by bioclimatologists. The one developed by Steadman [13] is often referred to as the Heat Stress Index (HSI). The HSI takes into account other relevant parameters in addition to temperature; it is expressed in the same units as temperatures, and each of the HSI thresholds is associated with typical stress symptoms (2). An average HSI profile based on 5 meteorological stations (3) around Paris is shown in the figure. It is clear that heat stress started rising significantly faster than maximum temperatures at the very beginning of August. HSI passed several critical thresholds before temperatures alone could motivate serious concern. The HSI "danger threshold" was exceeded on 4 August, before mortality started increasing, and the mortality peaks occurred after the HSI had remained for 9 consecutive days above the "danger threshold." The resulting four-year plan specifically allocated €4.26 billion to help the elderly: 200 new homes for the elderly will be built, and more specialized medical personnel will be hired. The plan stresses the development of "personal autonomy," strengthening medical care at home, and the monitoring of the elderly. The government has also taken a series of measures aimed at improving early warning systems, covering the "chain" from meteorological to health authorities [6]. In addition to institutional and technical shortcomings, the impact of the 2003 heat wave also illustrates some serious weaknesses of the welfare state and, in general, the low status assigned to the elderly by western European society. Even if half the victims were living in specialized institutions, it remains that large numbers were insufficiently cared for by their families, in spite of warnings issued daily by the weather service and transmitted by all TV stations. Maybe an effective way to reduce the vulnerability of seniors is to improve solidarity within the family. Footnotes:
References: [1] Jean-Yves Nau, Trois leçons sur la canicule, Le Monde,
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Early Warning Systems and Sustainable Development
The concepts of early warning and of sustainable development grew out of different settings and different societal needs. Aside from EWSs related to the military, EWSs were based on humanitarian concerns to forewarn governments and their citizens of potential hazards that might occur in the near term. It is a call for preparedness to local hazards. In addition, a usual tactical response to early warnings is to get things "back to normal," without regard to what that "normal" condition was. Sustainable development was based on environmental concerns and the need to protect the resource base in a country for use by future generations. It is a response to poverty reduction and environmental protection. The period of evaluation of an early warning begins immediately following the onset of a hazard. The period of evaluation for sustainable development could be years if not decades. One goal of sustainable development should be to improve upon "normal" and not just to preserve it. An early warning system is an important tool in a government's toolbox for achieving sustainable development. It can be used to encourage settlements to develop in relatively secure areas, while discouraging them from developing in less secure areas. It is in fact an integral part of the sustainable development process. It is in a way analogous to a flashlight for use along the path of development, illuminating obstacles to development, which then have to be dealt with. A hydro-meteorological hazard may take but a few hours, days or weeks to occur, but its adverse consequences can derail development efforts for years if not decades. An early warning system can help to identify and remove hazard-related obstacles to sustainable development. It is a necessary part of government operations and of sustainable development plans but it is not sufficient to assure that those plans will be successful. It is a cost-effective way to deal with potential disasters and to aid the process of, and prospects for, sustainable development. For purposes of illustration, society can be graphically represented by a pyramid, the base of which represents sustainable development. The apex of the pyramid represents an early warning sentinel. Its function is to protect society from harm due to natural hazards and those hazards that are anthropogenic. This suggests that early warning systems have the role of seeking to identify (like a spotlight) potential problems for a government, as it seeks to pursue environmentally and economically sound development strategies. One might view this graphic in an opposite way: the apex of the societal pyramid represents the various early warning systems in a given society. However, this pyramid rests on its apex and not on its base.
The point is that sustainable development prospects are very dependent on the effectiveness of the many early warning systems. Hazards are acknowledged to have the potential to set back economic development activities for long periods of time, because of the need to divert funds away from development to emergency, disaster and reconstruction activities. The society must rebuild the affected regions and socioeconomic sectors just to get back to "normal," and as noted earlier, normal may have been poor. This was the case of Honduras and the impacts of Hurricane Mitch, among the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, sustainable development prospects are much more dependent on successful early warnings than most observers and governments realize. One participant raised the idea that early warning systems must be kept independent of sustainable development planning activities. He noted that the responsibility of an early warning system was to be kept at a minimum, by only serving as a technical group to provide warnings upon which other groups must (in theory) act. The remaining participants, however, supported the belief that early warning systems must be an integral part of any government's sustainable development strategies. In fact, an EWS should actively contribute to sustainable development. An EWS is a necessary component within the sustainable development process. As noted in the Yokohama Message of 1994, "Disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and relief are four elements which contribute to and gain from the implementation of sustainable development policies" (OCHA Online, 2000). EWSs should be viewed as an essential component of development projects, which saves money. They are a component that specifically contributes toward, and is needed for, sustainable development. This sentiment appeared in a recent publication on disasters (Ingleton, 1999), when the former president of Brazil wrote the following: "Success in the prevention and reduction of natural disasters is closely related to the pursuit of sustainable development policies. Therefore, nations should incorporate preparedness against these phenomena into their social and economic agendas" (Cardoso, 1999).
The media can be used to educate the public, but this is really not their primary function. They are in business. They sell newspapers or advertising spots on TV and radio. It is important for an early warning system to partner with the media in a way that is mutually beneficial and for the public good. One way to do this is to "embed" an aspect of the media (i.e., a channel of communication) in the early warning system. There is a need to convince the media of the importance of an EWS, an organization that issues early warning. Such systems are not of great or urgent interest to the media; that is, unless they have identified a "trigger" to a hazard, or are responding to dire warnings of an imminent threat. Creeping environmental problems are generally not on the radar screen of the media. They lack the triggers of change that quick-onset hazards have. They do not easily capture the attention of journalists because the changes from day to day are imperceptible. There is no easily identifiable "warning bell" for a creeping environmental change that clearly degrades a society's vulnerability. Disasters are media-friendly. Creeping changes are not. Participants also mentioned the role that celebrities might play in bringing attention of the general public worldwide to creeping environmental changes. There are examples where movie stars or singers have spearheaded a cause célèbre, such as the singer Sting has done for the protection of the Amazon rainforest, or actress Bridget Bardot has done for the cause of protecting baby seals and other fur-bearing animals. Celebrities could include politicians, rock stars, and other personalities who are in the news. The media, like politicians, are always being pulled in several directions to cover a wide range of emerging issues. Realizing that some news days are slower than others, the best time to educate the media about hazards and early warnings and responses to them is during those relatively slow news periods. It is much more difficult for media representatives to take the time to learn about these issues at the moment of the onset of a hazard and potential disaster or when they have to deal with other newsworthy events. During the rush time of crises, the media may rely on people who they know will provide interesting sound bites about disasters or governmental involvement in them, even though the people interviewed may not be the most knowledgeable. Because the media reporters feel that they know them, they tend to rely on people who will provide information that reinforces or supports the views that they want to expose to the public. This has been the case with regard to the climate change debate between the IPCC scientists and the climate change skeptics. There is a need for an intermediary to act as a translator of the warning's technical contents and background to the media. The intermediary would convert technical language into text that the general public could understand and relate to. An intermediary could also help to convince the media to focus more on the facts than on rumors or bad news, which happens to be news that usually sells papers. One particular problem is that the media seek "news scoops." They want to be first with newsworthy information. In this regard, they may be in conflict with a warning system that issues warnings only when it feels it has the appropriate amount of credible indicators of the onset of a hazard. As one writer recently noted, "The compelling need to be first, but not necessarily right, seriously undermines veracity, particularly in medical, scientific, and environmental coverage" (Pinsdorf, 1999). The EWS wants to avoid creating a panic but also wants to issue a timely warning. Its credibility is constantly at stake. Not every warning is meant for public consumption and may be only for the eyes and ears of specific target audiences, such as relevant government agencies. Reporters will be reporters, however, and they, and especially their editors, tend to focus on scoops. As a result, their test for credibility of information may be lower than that of those responsible for early hazard warnings.
In theory, the media can be a powerful ally to an early warning system from hazard warning to disaster reconstruction. The media include photojournalism as well. Often, photos and satellite images capture the influence of the attention of readers and viewers. The text accompanying them only reinforces the images. Photos of "environmental refugees" fleeing from the impacts of a hazard along with regional environmental changes captured by satellites (the Aral Sea desiccation; deforestation in the Amazon) can generate a level of awareness and urgency that words alone cannot.
The globalization of communications has greatly affected early warnings. They are now coming in real time from all media (including the Internet) and from most countries. This is good on the one hand, because appeals for assistance can be broadcast instantaneously to every government and humanitarian organization around the globe. On the other hand, it might not be so good because some warnings may be based on rumor and not on reliable information. Every warning, as suggested earlier, has consequences; someone is listening to each warning. Even in the era of globalization the industrialized countries still have the advantage over the developing countries, because they are high-tech societies with instant, sometimes exclusive, access to satellite imagery that the developing countries do not have. The Internet presents a particular problem for early warning. A website can appear to be authoritative when it may not be. It can make ordinary rumors look authoritative and attractive. Thus, warnings issued via the worldwide web should carry with it a special "buyer beware" label. Perhaps one of a government's biggest concerns related to hazards is to avoid panic among the population. That is why good communications and a credible early warning system are very important. As noted earlier, there are problems when it comes to translating warning information across cultural lines. Some notions do not easily translate into other languages: for example, warnings, creeping change, and even specific color-coding. The early warning system must take full responsibility when it presents its messages to the public, the media and the government. It can use others to spread its messages, but it is the one responsible for getting that message understood. It can work with the media. It can hire intermediaries, but it is its responsibility to get the correct message out. There is a core need to get the warnings to remote areas that are likely to be in harm's way of specific regional hazards. Technologies exist to do that, but the will to carry it out does not seem very strong. As a result, remote populations are often the last to receive a warning, if they receive it at all. The truth of the matter is that there is no social equity when it comes to early warnings about potential disasters. Warnings come from many places, and this confuses the public. If the warnings reinforce each other, then that would amplify the message from the official warning system. If, however, warnings are of opposite sign, the public will choose the one it likes and will become divided, minimizing the value of the early warning.
Capacity building, some say capability building, is called for in a variety of development activities in developing countries. It is also called for in early warning systems. The fact is that human capacity already exists in just about every country. What is needed is a desire and a mechanism to bring people together and then to support them as they enhance their existing capabilities. It is also necessary to build additional early warning capacity among the general populations through education and training programs. There is a need as well to build institutional and public capacity for early warning. At the same time it is necessary to raise awareness of the milieu in which they operate. An early warning system cannot be effective if its milieu is not receptive to its functions and its messages. Support for capacity building cannot come from external agencies alone, but must come from domestic sources as well. In sum, capacity building related to early warning activities must be undertaken continuously, using incentives, and must be constantly upgraded, if capacity building is to be more than a political palliative devoid of real intentions. Just about everything we do in life, every decision, involves some form of an EW. Sometimes those warnings come as personal hunches. Other times they come from external sources such as a government agency. Many of the warning signals that exist around us are accepted without giving them a second thought, e.g., streetlights, speed limits and road signs. Many of the early warnings we receive relate directly or indirectly to life and death. Others relate to gains and losses of goods and services. As humans coming from a wide variety of backgrounds, we are free to interpret those warnings in different ways. As a result, what one person may see as a warning, another person may not. In any discussion of EWSs, disagreements can be expected on just about every definition of what constitutes early, a warning or a system. A wide range of views also exists on the meaning of sustainable development. Even within the hazards community, there are similar discussions about what constitutes a hazard and a disaster as well as about when a hazard turns into a disaster. A common distinction is that there are natural hazards that take place regardless of human activities: tornadoes, meteorological droughts, freezes, tropical storms, etc. Disasters are viewed by many as a natural hazard that has been influenced by human activities. For example, if people did not build homes in areas with a high risk to hurricane landfall, there would be no disaster, just a hurricane. If people did not live in trailer parks in tornado alley, there would be less damage to humans when tornadoes take place. The same can also be said of people who live in flood plains, near volcanoes, and so forth. More recently (late December 2003), the city of Bam, Iran was hit by a major (6.5 intensity) earthquake, probably one of the worst in that specific location in at least of a millennium. We can suggest this, because several buildings in the area have apparently survived tremors in past centuries, until now. Some people might argue that this was not a natural disaster because people had settled in an earthquake prone area. However, one needs to distinguish between people who build a known earthquake prone area in 2000 and those who did so in the year 1000. The point is that today we allegedly know better. In earlier times, depending on the hazard risk, people did not have the scientific information to back up claims that certain areas were high risk to hazards. Another distinction that might be made with hazards and disasters is that the at-risk populations, potential hazard victims, have no choice but to live where they do in order to eke out a living to feed their families. Others at risk may have a choice in the matter, such as whether to build a home on the hurricane prone outer banks of North Carolina or to build a home on an unstable cliff-side in El Nino-affected coastal California. Early warning systems, formal and informal, are a way of life in industrialized societies and agrarian ones. As important as they are today and as imperfect as they may continue to be in the future as societies struggle to gain a meaningful glimpse of the future, they will become even more important to societies in the future. As noted earlier, EWSs can be viewed as a component of the broader sustainable development process. The idea of sustainable development is to generate economic and social development results that are durable in a dynamic way. In a sustainable development situation society is constantly seeking protection against natural and anthropogenic crises. Society will develop mechanisms to help reduce its vulnerability (through development) by reducing the possible impacts of various types of hazards. An EWS is a tool that helps a society to cope better with natural or anthropogenic hazards. It is an important instrument for sustainable development.
As suggested earlier, it seems that all EWSs function well on paper. When one attends a conference in which EWSs are described, they usually present the structures, functions and successes of their specific systems. Some references are made to weaknesses, such as the lack of continual funding, the need for more government moral and financial support, the need for better communication with those at risk, and capacity building. While EWSs can be discussed in general terms (as we are doing in this report), there is a need for documenting the activities of early warning systems and objectively identifying their SWOCs, keeping in mind that all of the identified weaknesses and constraints provide potential opportunities for improvement. While the details of specific cases of early warning activities may not be transferable from one country to another, case studies can be used in illustrative ways for future as well as present generations who have to deal with similar kinds of hazards.
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Sample Early Warning SWOC Chart:
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ADPC, 2002: Overview of Early Warning Systems for Hydrometeorological Hazards in selected countries in Southeast Asia. Bangkok Thailand, p. 3. Associated Press, 2003: Lack of warnings helping market. J.M. Rosenberg (in Daily Camera, 27 December 2003). Berk, R.A. and R.G. Fovell, 1998: Public perceptions of climate change: A "willingness to pay" assessment. Climatic Change, 41, 413-446. Buchanan-Smith, M., 2000: Role of early warning systems in decision making processes. In: D.A. Wilhite, M.V.K. Sivakumar and D.A. Wood (eds.), Early Warning Systems for Drought Preparedness and Drought Management. Geneva: WMO, 22-31. Buchanan-Smith, M., 1997: What is a famine early warning system? Can it prevent famine? In: Internet Journal for African Studies, 2, Using Science Against Famine: Food Security, Famine Early Warning, and El Niño. www.esig.ucar.edu/ijas/ijasno2/smith.html Cardoso, F.H., 1999: Message from the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil. In: J. Ingleton, Natural Disaster Management. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Publishers, p. 5. DHA (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs), 1992: Internationally Agreed Glossary of Basic Terms Related to Disaster Management. Geneva: UN DHA, December. Fischhoff, B., 1994: What forecasts (seem to) mean. International Journal of Forecasting, 10, 387-403. Foster, H.D., 1980: Disaster Planning: The Preservation of Life and Property. New York: Springer Verlag, p. 67. Funk, S., 1986: Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: AMACOM, p. 5. GDRC (Global Development Research Center), www.gdrc.org/uem/capacity-define.html Gifis, S., 1991: Law Dictionary, 3rd ed. New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., pp. 195. Glantz, M.H. and D. Jamieson, 2000: Societal response to Hurricane Mitch and intra-versus intergenerational equity issues: Whose norms should apply? Special issue of Risk Analysis, 20(6), 869-882. Glantz, M.H. (ed.), 1994: Usable Science: Food Security, Early Warning and El Niño. Proceedings of the Workshop on ENSO/FEWS, Budapest, Hungary, 25-28 October 1993. Boulder, CO: ESIG/NCAR. 250 pp. Hamilton, R., 1999: Natural disaster reduction in the 21st century. In: J. Ingleton (ed.), Natural Disaster Management. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Publishers, 304-307. Hays, W., 1999: The IDNDR in perspective. In: J. Ingleton (ed.), Natural Disaster Management. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Publishers, 276-279. Ingleton, J. (ed.), 1999: Natural Disaster Management. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Publishers. 319 pp. IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change), 2001: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 881 pp. (p. 72) ISDR (UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 2003: Terminology: Basic terms of disaster risk reduction. On website at www.unisdr.org/eng/library/lib-terminology-eng%20home.htm Martin, B., 1979: The Bias of Science. O'Connor, Australia: Society for Social Responsibility. Maskrey, A., 1997: Report on National and Local Capabilities for Early Warning. IDNDR Early Warning Programme. Geneva: IDNDR Secretariat. MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment), 2003: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A Framework for Assessment. Washington, DC: Island Press. 245 pp. Mileti, D., 1999: Disasters by Design: A reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United States. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. 351 pp. OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Online, 2000: International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction: Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/programs/idndr/yokohama/message.html Pinsdorf, M., 1999: Media: Accelerate of damage? In: J. Ingleton (ed.), Natural Disaster Management. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Publishers, 191-194. Price, R.E., and H.D. Brown, 2000: A century of locus control in South Africa. In: Checke, R.A., L.J. Rosenberg, and M.E. Kieser (eds.), Workshop on Research Priorities for Migrant Pests of Agriculture in Southern Africa. Workshop held 24-26 March 1999 in Pretoria, South Africa. Chatham, UK: Natural Resources Institute, 37-49. Available in PDF format at ECOSAMP website: http://icosamp/ecoport.org/archives/mpw/P04.pdf. Rosa, J.G., 1963: Devil to Pay in the Backland [Grande Sertào: Veredas, 1963]. New York: Knopf. Schrodt, P.A. and D.J. Gerner, 1998: The impact of early warning on institutional responses to complex humanitarian crises. Paper presented at 3rd Pan-European International Relations Conference, Vienna, 16-19 September 1998. Tannehill, I.R., 1947: Drought and Its Causes and Effects. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 597 pp. UNCCD (UN Convention to Combat Desertification), 2003: UNCCD confirms NATO concern with desertification as a threat to security. UNCCD Press Release 19 December 2003. USA Today, 2003, "In orange terror alerts, wary cities hold back; color warnings are vague and drain budgets, they say: it isn't working." July 2, p. 1. |
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Appendix 1: Hurricane Early Warning in Cuba. An Uncommon Experience Lino Naranjo Diaz Introduction Hurricanes are one of the more deadly natural disasters and are likely in the area of the Tropical Atlantic and the Caribbean, they are the deadliest. In the USA, for instance, their damages exceed those due to other hazards. In other countries in the area, damages are simply enormous, remember Hurricane Mitch that in 1998 killed thousands of people in Central America. In a hurricane, we find almost all kinds of weather disasters: very strong winds, heavy rains, floods, high sea, tornadoes. But strong winds are considered their main and most dangerous characteristic and them they are classified by the maximum wind speed in 5 categories called the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Most dangerous hurricanes are those in categories 3, 4 and 5.
However, Cuban authorities faced the hurricane, taking important protective measures and evacuating more than 700, 000 people. As a result only 5 casualties were reported. A very small number of casualties in Cuba during hurricanes has become usual in the last decades. Comparison with other poor countries in the area is simply dramatic and only human losses in the USA could be considered to compare. As a result, the Cuban experience has created strong controversies among politics and researchers; some of them have called for a careful look at risk reduction policy in socialist countries. In the Cuban case there are a variety of multifactorial causes behind these results. They can be resumed by considering three main components from IDNDR: (1) the public's awareness of hazard risk; (2) public policy commitment; and (3) applied scientific knowledge.
Of course, this is may not be the only reason but when people have an adequate idea about risk and how to proceed, they have more chance to stay alive.
The second component has a very special behavior, maybe unique. Cuba is a socialist country, a survivor from the socialism crash of the 1980s and 1990s. Its political structure is based on a centralized and long-lasting one-party communist government with no significant internal political struggles, which are very common in other countries. Such institutional stability highly favors the development of long-term plans, which can be applied and monitored in society in a practical undisturbed way for many years. The hurricane coping capacity is considered, as well as education and health, as a piece of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. Government caring about its people is not only symbolic or altruistic, but is also a practical action that proves the superiority of the Cuban system vs. neighboring countries. Since the onset of the socialist government in the 1960s, Cuba has been immersed in a historical conflict with the US government which maintains a severe economic embargo against Cuba (Cubans claim it as a blockage). As a consequence of this conflict, Cuban society is highly organized under the umbrella of a military doctrine in order to face eventual US aggression. Response plans are included into this doctrine to take advantage from the system.
The third component is maybe the least known of all. Cuba has a traditionally high level of scientific knowledge about hurricanes.
This development brought some conflict with the American Weather Service, mainly because the Cubans were extremely good at predicting cyclones - way better than the US could hope to be. As early as 1870 they had set up a network of hundreds of observers and runners that were well trained and dedicated to the job. Their director, Father Benito Vines, dedicated his life to cyclone prediction and enjoyed great success. After the disaster of Hurricane Flora in 1963 (more than 2,000 deaths) the Cuban government, supported by the former Soviet Union, undertook a serious effort to improve the national meteorological service. Soon, Cuba became self-sufficient in warning capability, and in the wake of the US-Cuba conflict , during the 1970s and the 1980s, the relationship between the NHC and the Cuban meteorological service reached its historical lowest point.
The Institute of Meteorology of Cuba possesses the leadership in hurricane
predictions and monitoring as a function of the Cuban State. Its monitoring
facilities are based on a network of more than 120 stations, 5 radars
and operational access to satellite pictures. Operational forecasts are
supported by their own hurricane prediction methods. In fact, Cuba is
one of the few Western Hemisphere countries with major scientific research
about hurricanes.
Cuban disaster management organization is not only focused on emergency response but also in risk reduction activities. Preparedness plans are designed to build capacities in local and rural areas under risk, to take measures. Although preparedness plans are established under military decision-making practices, military and civilian structures in the Cuban society practically overlap, ensuring a strong coordination between them. The internal Cuban economy remains highly centralized and government dependent; individual owners are practically reduced only to small business. Under these conditions resources, infrastructures and transportation for evacuation and other protective measures come from only one source.
Cuba's experience is hard to be fully applied in a western-type society because it is supported by very different societal and economic bases. Undoubtedly, ideological basis, societal and economic structures performed under a communist government tends to favour its capability to take actions directly on any social or economical activity. However, in the Cuban case, the conflict with the United States and the embargo establish important singularities. A society severely stressed by an economic embargo, among others factors, has to be very concerned about natural disaster impacts. Besides, under a strong ideological struggle against capitalism, the Cuban government considers itself under a permanent military aggression risk, developing a military doctrine which involves every stage of society creating quick reaction capacities for emergency response. In fact, Cubans have been forced to be more efficient in facing natural disasters in a scenario of political conflict with the US government. This is maybe an opposite view of the disaster diplomacy approach. Protective measures under a conflict are developed in such a way that the enemy would not be able to take advantages from the disaster. In the Cuban experience, not everything is politics. There is a solid historical background of social awareness about hurricane risk and technical capabilities in hurricane warning that it may be unique in the Americas. Despite singularities, some lessons could be established from the Cuban experience in EWS. A strong societal awareness could be constructed over public perceptions of risk This is a long term educational task in many countries under hurricane risk. Poverty, isolation, lack of education, and inclusive traditional feelings about fate are majors obstacles to reach this goal. The development of capabilities in hurricane monitoring and prediction are a crucial matter to reach an effective EWS. Almost all countries in the Caribbean and Central America area are highly dependent on the NHC products in the framework of the WMO region IV coordination. This ensures access to basic information. However, under the direct impact of a hurricane, national monitoring capability plays the main role, and many countries are not able to assume this responsibility. Regarding this last topic, the National Hurricane Center plays a very important role in the Early Warning System strategies in the Caribbean, including Cuba. However, this role cannot be a substitute for those of the national weather services. Unfortunately, many governments in the area do not have a strategy to build capacities and leave almost all warning responsibilities to the NHC. The achievement of adequate EWS is only possible when national authorities (political, public and private, all together) have the will to make a sustained commitment in establishing measures to educate and protect people. And this is the most difficult task.. It may be unreachable for many countries in the current century... |
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Appendix 2: Outcomes of Recent Early Warning Systems Meetings The Second International Conference On Early Warning: 16-18 October 2003 Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD), www.iisd.org Presentation of Conference Outcome and Follow-Up: Sálvano Briceño, ISDR, introduced the draft document "Effective Early Warning to Reduce Disasters: The Need for More Coherent Action at All Levels," which contains the recommendations of EWC-II. He said that the document responds to: an increasing disaster burden; a growing recognition of the role of early warning; slow progress in effective use of warnings; specific proposals generated by EWC-II; and the need for an organized international approach. The document identifies five focus areas for an international early warning programme:
In conclusion, Briceño emphasized that there is a new and urgent opportunity to develop early warning as a contributor to disaster impact reduction. He noted the commitment of partner institutions to collaborate in building a structured programme for the future. He said that this begins of a new phase in the continuing process of dialogue and productive collaboration. Presentation of Conference Statement: Briceño then introduced the draft EWC-II Statement. In the Statement, the Conference considers that natural disasters are increasingly becoming an impediment to achieving sustainable development goals, and recognizes that:
The Statement calls for:
The Statement welcomes Germany's offer of additional support to ISDR, invites other governments to contribute, and expresses appreciation to the German authorities for hosting EWC-II. In the ensuing discussion on the two EWC-II outcomes, one participant suggested including a definition of early warning, and several proposed using the terms "natural phenomena," or "natural and human-induced environmental disasters" instead of "natural disasters." Briceño said the term "natural hazards" had been used wherever possible. Participants noted insufficient consideration of risk management, vulnerability, gender, local wisdom and traditional knowledge in the Statement. A proposal was made to expand the invitation to support the early warning programme to development agencies and private institutions, and to add a provision on promoting transboundary cooperation and technical data exchange. Germany confirmed its commitment to additional contributions to ISDR. Japan announced that it will submit a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly on its intention to host a world conference on disaster reduction in Kobe, in January 2005. Closing Remarks: In his closing remarks, Hans-Joachim Daerr, Federal Foreign Office, Germany, called for implementation of the recommendations of EWC-II, and for continued research and exchange of views on early warning. Sálvano Briceño thanked participants, the German Government and the City of Bonn for support and hospitality provided for EWC-II, as well as all individuals, agencies and organizations that contributed to its success. ADPC (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center), 2002 Recommendations:
The conference was organized, with the support of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, within the framework of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR 1990-1999), established by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1989. The subject of the conference dealt with an essential goal of the decade, expressed as a major priority of the Decade's Scientific and Technical Committee. It was included in the Plan of Action adopted at the 1994 World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in Yokohama, Japan, and was the subject of three subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions (between 1994 and 1997) on the improved effectiveness of early warning. The conference was opened by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Klaus Kinkel, as an expression of Germany's support for disaster reduction in line with his initiative delivered at the UN General Assembly session in 1993 calling for improved early warning capacities for disasters that have an adverse effect on the environment. The subsequent discussions and presentations at the conference confirmed early warning as a core component of national and international prevention strategies for the 21st Century. The conference was closed with the issuance of this declaration. The frequency and severity of natural disasters have increased in recent years, and these trends are expected to continue well into the next century. There is therefore a strong need to strengthen disaster reduction policies around the world to ensure that natural hazards do not result in economic and social disasters. Natural disasters have significant impacts on the economic development, physical sustainability and social well-being of all countries, particularly developing countries. They cause the loss of lives and human resources and threaten individual livelihoods. Disasters interrupt economic activity and destroy economic assets and financial investment. They also reduce private and corporate income, diminish job opportunities, cause declines in trade and commerce, and disrupt markets and business continuity. Disasters can result in the reorientation of public investment from economic development to the needs of urgent rehabilitations of infrastructure and other immediate emergency requirements. Consequently, disaster reduction measures, including effective early warning, contribute to the creation of a low risk environment, thereby becoming a positive factor in international economic competitiveness and the maintenance of productive partnerships. Economic losses can be reduced considerably if a culture of prevention is introduced within a society at all levels - and particularly when local communities understand that response is not the only strategy when disaster strikes. Participants shared their experience and identified opportunities provided by modern technology and scientific knowledge in conjunction with demonstrated commitments of public policy and local community endeavor. This has contributed to a concerted international framework for improved early warning capacities. They also made recommendations about information exchange, research priorities, technological applications, and institutional relationships that could result in the development of improved local capabilities. Many tragic events in recent years have demonstrated the cost of inadequate warning systems. By contrast, the successful application of local preparedness initiatives, such as those made possible by the effective communication of scientific analysis prior to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991, among others, emphasizes both the feasibility and the value of early warning. The successful application of early warning is among the most practical and effective measures for disaster prevention. It is a process that provides timely information so that communities are not only informed, but sufficiently impressed, that they take preparedness actions before and during the anticipated hazardous event. It depends on practical relationships between science and technology, and the understanding of social and economic implications of disasters in the context of sustainable development. Building on this foundation there is now a need to ensure that early warning of natural disasters becomes an integral part of government policy in every disaster-prone country, and that it forms an effective instrument for their preventive strategies. Ultimately, it must be comprehended by and motivate communities at greatest risk, including those disenfranchised and particularly disadvantaged people, who must take appropriate protective actions. In all of these cases, established organizational structures and already existing technical capacities should be considered first, rather than the assumption being made that new and possibly unproven systems may be best suited. The Potsdam Early Warning Conference has identified major strengths and weaknesses in early warning capacities around the world. Participants repeatedly emphasized the multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral character of the early warning process. Although based on scientific and technology, early warning must be tailored to serve people's needs, their environments, and their resources. Successful early warning requires unrestricted access to data that is freely available for exchange. Ultimately, all resulting information must be credible, and emanate from a single officially designated authority. Participants emphasized that early warning is effective only to the extent
that policy makers at national levels of authority have the will, and
make a sustained commitment of resources that will establish protective
measures. It is crucial that these measures support the development of
early warning capabilities at the community level and that they be based
on local vulnerability and risk assessments. In all of these respects,
the importance of training was stressed, as was the requirement to provide
resources for ongoing training activities, public education and the development
of both technical and operational capabilities essential for early warning.
Presentations at the Potsdam Early Warning Conference demonstrated significant improvements in long-term forecasting of climate anomalies, such as El Niño episodes, which enables more rapid and extensive warnings pertaining to climate variability. Through its International Framework, the IDNDR can bring early warning activities, such as this, to the forefront of global and national disaster reduction policies. An immediate example where this may be valuable is to bring the results of the Potsdam Early Warning Conference to the attention to the first intergovernmental meeting of experts on the El Niño (ENSO) phenomenon. This meeting has been called for by the fifty-second United Nations General Assembly and is being organized in Guayaquil, Equador, from 9-13 November 1998 specifically to enable the conclusion of early warning issues in the review of the 1997-1998 El Niño event. Conclusions Considering the preceding discussion of the deliberations that took place at the Potsdam Early Warning Conference, the participants have drawn the following conclusions which must be seen in a larger context than this meeting. They can only achieve their true value by being translated into concrete actions.
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Appendix 4: Agenda for EWS Workshop in Shanghai, China
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Appendix 5: Viewbook |
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Last Updated: 20 January 2004 |
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is part of the National Center for
Atmospheric Research, which is managed by the University
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The
system is structured in "defense zones" spread throughout the
country. It allows the system to send information to the governments of
provinces and municipalities. The main economic and social concerns under
risk maintain direct phone lines to the centers of the Civil Defense.
Broadcast radio and TV networks and newspapers are public services fully
controlled by the government. There are not private networks. Under a
hurricane warning, all media are fully subordinated to the national defense
council to play a role in disseminating warning and instructions for the
public.
