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Flashpoints
Informal Planning Meeting
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Flashpoints
Informal Planning Meeting (IPM) Annotated agenda with discussion results Prepared by Michael H. Glantz (with input from participants)
Round-the-table introductions The participants to the Informal Planning Meeting (IPM) were drawn from a wide range of disciplines: public health, political science, meteorology, water resources, atmospheric science, engineering, philosophy, geography, oceanography, African studies, Russian studies, and public policy. They were from the United States, the UK, Ethiopia, and the Philippines. Geographic areas of interest encompassed Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, East, Central, South, Southwest and Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and the United States - rural as well as urban areas. Functional areas of concern included but were not limited to conflict, water, food security, public health and safety, environmental degradation, intelligence, political, economic and cultural stability.
"Climate" refers to the statistical description of the physical attributes of the atmosphere, especially precipitation, temperature, pressure, and relative humidity. This would encompass, for example, precipitation surpluses and shortfalls (i.e., meteorological droughts). "Climate-related" refers to agricultural and hydrological droughts, drought-related fires, heat waves, crop yields, etc. Workshop objective Development economist Jeffrey Sachs recently commented on the importance of "transitions" with respect to economic development prospects, noting one point that is at the center of a purpose behind our discussion and consideration of climate and climate-related flashpoints. He suggested that "the main lesson about transitions is that small amounts of help at crucial moments can tip the balance toward successful outcomes" (Sachs, 2001). With Sachs' statement in mind, the overriding purpose of the IPM on climate and climate-related flashpoints was to assess the possible utility of the flashpoints concept as the last of the early warnings of potential climate-related problems that governments might have to face before an irreversible change occurs. Can a climate anomaly or weather extreme lead to instability in a political system, government, culture or economy? In the event that the answer to that question proved to be yes, the next question to address was whether the concept could be operationalized for use in decision-making processes related to disaster avoidance and stability enhancement. A new report on "Assessing the Impact of Policy-Oriented Social Science Research" (IFPRI, 2002) commented on the value to policy makers of early warning activities, including research: "Anticipatory research that alerts policymakers to possible future scenarios and surprises also can be extremely valuable in reducing the time lag before welfare-enhancing changes are made" (p. 1).
The next level represents areas at risk or areas of concern (AOCs), as they are referred to in the US Great Lakes region. These are regions in which human activities (or climate change of some duration) have adversely affected the ecosystem to the point of endangering its survival or generating a major ecological shift. For example, irrigating an arid or semiarid area improperly can lead to salinization of soils or waterlogging. Considerable care must be taken to avoid such outcomes. As the number of shrimp farms increase in a given mangrove forest, the productivity and long term sustainability of the forest as well as of coastal marine life begins to fall into question. Monitoring of the changes of the quality of the various environmental ingredients in areas at risk becomes extremely important. Indicators have to be identified so that human activities and the ecosystems that support it can be sustained over long periods of time if not indefinitely. Some of those indicators will be objective measurements of change while others will be qualitative in nature, and still others will be anecdotal and difficult to measure but nevertheless can serve as early warning. Hotspots are situations in which human activities interacting with environmental processes have reached destructive levels. While many of those activities continue to be carried out they do so with less efficiency and effectiveness and with increasingly destructive impacts on the environment. The hotspots range on the continuum can be further subdivided with the use of appropriate indicators of threshold changes into hot, hotter and hottest spots. Up till now, the indicators used (whatever ones were chosen by the monitoring agents) serve as a warning system of sorts, allowing ample time for decision and policy makers to take steps to mitigate or avoid additional problems that might stem from the interaction between human activities and environmental processes. The threshold or transition into flashpoints is different, however. Thus, flashpoints encompasses the range on the continuum in which decision and policy makers are placed in a truly crisis decision-making mode. They have a short time to act before a catastrophe of some sort occurs, the stakes of inaction are high, and the threat to a valued good is perceived to be high as well. As we are concerned with climate and climate-related flashpoints, we need to look at how that interaction in a given location between humans and the environment might be affected by climate variability and climate and weather extremes. El Niño events, which recur within a 2- to 7-year period, disrupt regional climate regimes worldwide. One could argue that El Niño is a hazard-spawner, sparking drought and floods, along with temperature anomalies, worldwide. Given that there is some degree of forecasting skill associated with the quasi-periodic air-sea interaction anomalies in the Pacific Ocean (i.e., El Niño or La Niña), identifying this as a climate-related flashpoint can be useful for decision makers to accelerate their decision-making processes to avert transitioning into the next stage, the firepoint, where there are likely to be critical and irreversible changes in the region of concern. The time to act is short, and the potential costs for decisions are perceived to be high. Flashpoints serve as the last early warning that decision makers will get before the likelihood of irreversible and likely unwanted change in environment or in society. The flashpoint and firepoint concepts are taken from chemistry in an attempt to illustrate (by analogy) to decision makers the seriousness of the environment-society-climate nexus about to occur. These are usable metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). One participant suggested that the virtue of the flashpoints metaphor is that it serves as a transition zone between disaster preparedness and after-the-fact disaster response. It is important to note that the scientific community is very dependent on the use of analogies and metaphors in its research, and especially in climate modeling efforts, more so than might be realized. For example, modelers refer to the "slab ocean" or the "swamp model" for representing the ocean environment. They refer to the "bucket" when discussing soil moisture. The physical scientists are no strangers to metaphors (Glantz, 1991).
Flashpoints provide society with yet another way to gain some insight into climate-relate problems its decision makers might have to face. It is not a proverbial "silver bullet" {one solution solve all problems}, but it can help to identify problems that have reached their late stages of development. It could be that flashpoint identification serves as an eleventh-hour catalyst to action because of a perceived or identifiable "clear and present danger." A flashpoint can be viewed either as an event or as a process. It must be made clear during discussions of climate-environment-society interactions the way in which the discussants view it. We seem to have agreed that flashpoints represents a process that is embedded in a larger process (i.e., the aforementioned continuum of early warnings). Attention must also be paid to the fact that concepts like flashpoints are sometimes difficult to translate into other languages and cultures. Flashpoints can be identified based on existing environmental degradation in different types of ecosystems, political conflict, ecological fragility, societal vulnerability, or situations that are in unstable equilibrium. Climate-related flashpoints refer to climate anomalies or climate or weather extremes that can disrupt human activities, environmental processes and the processes that involve the interaction between society and the environment. Examples of past flashpoints Participants in this session proposed national and transboundary flashpoints that occurred in the past. Discussion ensued about transboundary water as causing flashpoints to occur. Mention was made of "water wars," but it was proposed that there have not yet been any hot wars over water: conflicts, yes; wars, no. Water and, therefore, climate-related conflicts over water, however, have been numerous. Conflict refers to negotiations over water rights and ownership, and the like. Water resources as opposed to climate resources are very sensitive issues when discussed in political and other arenas. Shifts in regional water supply as a result of seasonal or interannual climate anomalies or due to extreme weather events can lead to heated debates over rights and obligations among protagonists, especially between upstream and downstream countries. Specific examples that were suggested as climate-related flashpoints include the following:
It was suggested that other environment-related flashpoints might provide information about governmental responses to crises: earthquakes in various locations, industrial and nuclear accidents, and so forth. As noted earlier, while such analogies can be instructive, they must be used with care, as no two situations are exactly alike. A drought of the same intensity and duration in the same location but at two different times may have totally different impacts depending on changes in land use or changes in the level of societal vulnerability.
Each of the participants presented the interests of his/her particular agency or activity in the concept of climate-related flashpoints. Those interests included but were not limited to the following: national security, food security, water resources, public health at the community level, maintenance of political stability, economic development prospects, disaster avoidance and disaster mitigation, need for more appropriate climate-related forecasts, identification of research needs in the area of climate related impact assessment and in policy making, avoid conflict as well as surprise, shed light on the social aspects of climate, identify what information is crucial to users of climate information, capacity building for hotspots and flashpoints identification, identify climate-related risk, and avoid reaching firepoints. It became clear that whatever the primary interest of an organization or decision maker, a key objective was to avoid being surprised, even if the organization or the decision maker decides to take no action.
Foreseeability is a concept that has been used in the law profession for more than a century. According to one definition (Gifis, 1991), it is a concept used in various areas of the law to limit the liability of a party for the consequences of his/her acts to consequences that are with the scope of a FORESEEABLE RISK, i.e., risks whose consequences a person of ordinary prudence would reasonably expect might occur . In tort law a party's actions may be deemed negligent only where the injurious consequences of those actions were foreseeable. The concept also "encompasses not only that which the defendant foresaw, but that which the defendant ought to have foreseen" (Gifis, 1991). There are two parts to this definition. The first relates to the idea that certain events or their impacts are likely to occur under certain circumstances, i.e., they are foreseeable. This is a qualitative version of a probability statement. While no quantitative determination of probability has been made, there is a greater than zero likelihood of some event occurring. For example, it is foreseeable that when irrigation practices are undertaken in arid lands, there is a good chance that soil degradation (e.g., salinization) will take place in the absence of proper land management. Thus, certain impacts on the environment resulting from human activities are foreseeable. Add a climate anomaly or weather extreme to the society-environment interaction, and some impacts are likely to be foreseeable. "Foresee" is defined in the dictionary as follows: Oxford English Dictionary - Online That which may be foreseen.
Freq. in phrase foreseeable future. Merriam-Webster Main Entry: fore·see
synonyms FORESEE, FOREKNOW, DIVINE, ANTICIPATE mean to know beforehand. FORESEE implies nothing about how the knowledge is derived and may apply to ordinary reasoning and experience <economists should have foreseen the recession>. The second aspect of the concept of foreseeability relates to responsibility. Foreseeability comes from tort law. However, from the perspectives of flashpoints and the desire to avoid adverse outcomes from society-environment-climate interactions, we are less concerned with laying blame for those responsible for the cause (or causes) that brought a particular situation to a flashpoint than we are about avoiding the "firepoint." The concept of foreseeability generated considerable discussion about whether it is useful in identifying climate-related flashpoints, with some participants challenging its value and others supporting its use in flashpoint assessment. Those who supported the use of the concept for disaster avoidance or response felt that it could be operationalized as part of an early warning system. It was suggested that it was possible to make risks to climate-related problems foreseeable. It was also suggested that because risks can be identified there is no assurance that decisions will be taken to cope with them. Those who challenged the concept questioned such phrases in the definition of foreseeability as "reasonably prudent person." The legal profession, however,has managed to cope with such phrases on a case-by-case basis.
A presentation was made by Anthony Barnston, Director of Forecasting at the IRI that centered on the reliability of teleconnections associated with El Niño. The chart depicting El Niño's rainfall teleconnections around the globe was discussed and debated at length. The reliability of the Ropelewski & Halpert map depicting in a gross way El Niño's impacts was questioned. For example, the apparent linkage between El Niño and drought in India appears to have disappeared after the mid-1970s. This map is an important one because it is the one that is usually shown in the media stories about El Niño's impacts. Some of the areas depicted, however, do have fairly reliable teleconnections with El Niño such as rains in northern Peru and droughts in Northeast Brazil, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia, among others. The warm (and cold) extremes of the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) provide a quasi-periodic climate signal that can provide some countries with an early warning of possible climate-related problems. The severity of those problems depends on a set of factors: the level of vulnerability of a society, the occurrence of a climate anomaly or weather extreme and the level of awareness of the possible adverse aspects of their interactions and a political will to do something about it. The example that was most often referred to was that of Zimbabwe today, as noted earlier. Political instability, economic problems, alienation from potential international donors, etc. and the possibility of an El Niño event later in the year makes President Mugabe's government of Zimbabwe a potential flashpoint not just for Zimbabwe but for other countries in southern Africa, from South Africa to Zambia. As of today, it could be argued that it has already become a hotspot, moving in the direction of a flashpoint, a climate-related flashpoint.
Operationalizing the notion of flashpoints We then discussed whether and how to apply flashpoints to climate-related instability, instability in economy, policy, culture, etc., as well as conflicts and disasters. Which way to go: To begin discussion, two basic ways were proposed to deal with identifying climate and climate-related flashpoints: (1) Identify conflict or conflict-prone situations or locations and see if and how climate-related impacts might influence them, and (2) Identify climate-sensitive areas and identify other societal and environmental stressors. What does each approach provide and what does it not provide to those concerned about identifying flashpoints? (3) Identify indicators for flashpoints. During the meeting, various attempts at defining the term "flashpoints" met with lively discussion. One participant suggested that the following three components must be present in order for a state of affairs to be called a flashpoint: (1) a physical climate process that produces a severe objective compromise of the ecosystem in the target area; (2) an absence of reserve margins of food, water, and/or entitlements; and (3) the presence of an awakened political awareness of the approach of a potential crisis and the will to act. Discussion revolved around the third point, whereas it was suggested that if the third part (awakened political awareness) were not present, a crisis exists but not a flashpoint. Future possible climate-related flashpoints were then briefly discussed:
Throughout the meeting, there were references to other regions around the globe that related to areas of concern (the US Great Lakes), areas at risk (Central Asia), hotspots (biodiversity; agriculture-environment), and flashpoints (war, water conflicts). Firepoint is the only concept (borrowed from chemistry or fire protection) that has not yet been applied to societal or environmental problems, until now.
The advantage of the probabilistic composites over the Ropelewski-Halpert map is that the real-world situation is not an "on or off" condition (impact or no impact with regard to precipitation or temperature), but rather a matter of the degree of certainty of the impact. Impacts are not necessarily a linear function of the strength of the event in all episodes, and the regions having well-defined impacts are not neatly shaped as one may conclude from the Ropelewski-Halpert map. The probabilistic composite offers a more quantitative, more detailed evaluation of impacts, varying over the annual flow of the seasons, than does the map. It also uses a larger and more modern data set. [NB: the probabilistic composites are summarized in a paper by Mason and Goddard (2001), and can also be found on the IRI website at pred.ldeo.columbia.edu/research/ENSO/enso.html - see, for example, a composite from this website for summer precipitation (June-July-August) in Asia for above, normal, and below-normal below.]
Today the media are, for the most part, omnipresent or at least have access to all societies. Yet, in 1999, for example, there were several climate-related disasters occurring around the globe, but only a few received global attention and media coverage. This is true every year. Several examples were discussed: (1) the mudslides in Venezuela. A case study carried out at Columbia University found that the national media were focused on the presidential election in Venezuela, as opposed to weather conditions near Caracas. Only after the disaster took place did the national and international media turn their attention toward the impacts of the mudslides, which caused tens of thousands of deaths and destruction that affected all socioeconomic classes. (2) Hurricane Mitch was discussed as a disaster that captured American attention because of its proximity to the United States and because of the cause of the disaster: a hurricane. (3) It was suggested that the media drove the international response to the disastrous floods in Mozambique in 2000. In fact, more specifically, it was driven by the video clip of a woman giving birth in a tree during the destructive floods. One participant pointed out that, of these disasters, Venezuela was a local disaster, and Mozambique and Hurricane Mitch were regional disasters. Each of these received global coverage, and in each case the response was in large measure driven by film coverage and photos. Many climate-related disasters are often in progress but not of interest to the media or various governments (even though humanitarian and disaster relief agencies may be working with those affected). In 1984, famine was occurring in Ethiopia, and although many governments knew about it, they did little to help, because the government was that of a Marxist leader (Mengistu). When a BBC video was smuggled out of the Korem Refugee Camp, and shown on international media, all governments were embarrassed because of their lack of response to aid victims. Once again, it seems that photojournalists have had an instrumental role in bringing international attention to various disasters that might otherwise have been under-reported. There is also the problem of the "pariah" states. Some countries, despite the disasters they face (manmade or natural), are just not given a high priority by the globalized media. For example, Chechnya's humanitarian needs are major, but little attention has been focused in the area by the world media. With the widespread reach of the media, sometimes the disaster is reported by national sources, and other times by the foreign media. Several participants
noted that their governments were first warned about the onset of the
1997-98 El Niño by the foreign meteorological services via the
electronic or printed media or by the Internet. This creates problems
for local scientists and media, because government officials want to know
why they are not warned about potential problems by their own staff. This
raised an interesting question: can climate-related flashpoints be "created"
by the media, even if they do not exist? The last example raised in this session pertained to the Horn of Africa. Apparently, food aid during severe food crises in both Ethiopia and Eritrea was used to pressure the governments of these countries to end their protracted conflict. In a way, the region's inhabitants had their own colloquial indicators of a bad situation (hotspot) becoming worse (flashpoint): First the cows died, then the goats died, and finally, the camels died.
The concept of disaster diplomacy was discussed with respect to its potential use in the defusing of flashpoints. Ilan Kelman provided an overview of the concept and its successes and failures in specific situations. He referred the participants to the Cambridge publication on disaster diplomacy (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, XIV(1), 2000), which presented three case studies that examine the concept: US-Cuban relations and El Niño; Greece-Turkey relations and earthquakes; and the 1991-93 drought emergency in southern Africa. (See the website at www.disasterdiplomacy.org.) Following this CRIA publication, three additional cases were reviewed: India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, and North Korea. It generated discussion about the potential use of disaster diplomacy in avoiding flashpoints. While it was suggested that disaster diplomacy may have some contributory value to defusing hotspots and flashpoints, it was not seen as a sufficient approach. It was suggested that it should be one of many tools that could be used to improve diplomatic relations between countries involved in conflict situations. Any change in hostile relations between countries requires a thaw in relations at the highest levels of government, rather than just the occurrence of a natural disaster. Disasters do not generate meaningful long-term changes between two countries that are otherwise antagonists. Several examples were suggested in which disasters had little impact on diplomatic relations: Cuba refused US food aid during a recent drought; Venezuela refused US assistance following devastating mudslides; Eritrea and Ethiopia continued their armed conflict even in the face of potential drought-related food shortages. The point was made that there were many more situations of non-cooperation by political antagonists in time of need than there were successes. It was suggested that it is naïve to think that humanitarian or disaster assistance would not be political, on either the offering or the receiving end of that assistance. Agencies have a difficult time trying to keep the politics of disaster assistance to a minimum. Some participants suggested that it is more fruitful to improve diplomatic relations by focusing on the scientific aspects of the disaster, leaving out the political aspects. Examples were provided: past IRI climate forums that focus on forecasting seasonal climate conditions, held in various parts of Africa, South America, and Asia were identified as examples of the scientific problem-solving approach to improving regional interactions.
The IPM concluded on a positive note. The concept of climate-related flashpoints would continue to be assessed for its possible contribution to early warning of potential climate and climate-related problems that decision makers at various levels of society might have to face. It appears that the concept could be used to supplement or complement existing climate-related early warning systems by providing a late early warning, or the last warning before a situation involving a climate anomaly or weather extreme becomes a societal crisis leading to instability in a political system, cultural harmony or economic well-being. Discussions will continue among the participants and with disaster response and humanitarian agencies seeking to strengthen their capabilities in identifying and averting foreseeable disasters. The importance of disaster response agencies to work more closely with those agencies dealing with long-term development issues was strongly suggested. In sum, the IPM accomplished what its organizers set out to do: discuss the potential value for early warning to decision makers of potential climate and climate-related problems they might have to face. Ideas were put forth for consideration by the participants, who represented a wide range of interests, organizations, and disciplines. Few ideas put forth made it through the proverbial gauntlet unscathed? Concepts such as flashpoint, firepoint, hotspot, disaster diplomacy, static versus dynamic risk, and foreseeability generated useful discussion and "food for thought" for those interested in further pursuit of these concepts to their application to climate and climate-related disasters.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs (CRIA), 2000: Special Issue. December, XIV(1). Gifis, S., 1991. Law Dictionary. Third Edition. New York: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 195-196. Glantz, M.H., 1991: The use of analogies in forecasting ecological and societal responses to global warming. Environment, 33(5), 12-30. IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), 2002: Assessing the impact of policy-oriented social science research. Available in PDF at www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib5.pdf Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson, 1980: Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 181-214. Mason, S., and L. Goddard, 2001: Probabilistic precipitation anomalies associated with ENSO. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 82, 619-638. Oxford English Dictionary On-line Ropelewski, C. F. and M.S. Halpert, 1987: Global and regional scale precipitation patterns associated with the El Niño/Southern Oscillation. Monthly Weather Review, 115, 1606-1626. Sachs, J.S., 2001: as quoted in The Washington Quarterly, "The strategic significance of global inequality," p. 196 (summer issue). Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1991. Merriam-Webster, Inc., Publishers, Springfield, Massachusetts, USA.
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