Papua New Guinea Country Case Study:
Impacts and Responses to the 1997-98 El Niño Event
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Executive Summary
Background
Papua New Guinea is the largest developing country in the Southwest Pacific region. It consists of the eastern part of the large island of New Guinea and about 600 smaller islands ranging in size from the large islands of the Bismarck Archipelago, up to 200 kilometers long, to small islands and atolls only a few hectares in area.
Most of the larger islands are mountainous. The main range that stretches along the length of the island of New Guinea is one of the great mountain ranges of the world with major peaks over 4,000 meters high and many highland areas over 2,000 meters high. The range contains well-populated fertile valleys, inhabited for up to 9,000 years that support a large section of the population. The terrain is so rugged that some valleys were virtually cut off until this century and even now many can only be accessed by air or on foot. A chain of volcanoes lies along the north coast of New Guinea and through the Bismarck Archipelago and North Solomon Islands, all of which are close to the tectonic plate boundary. Coral reefs fringe many coasts and islands, particularly in the east.
Papua New Guinea has a tropical climate. The monsoonal rainy season from about November to April mainly affects the south of the country and the highlands and small islands normally experience year-round rain. Average temperatures on the coast and in the islands range from 21 to 32 degrees Centigrade with high humidity. The highlands are cooler with frost being experienced on a few occasions each year above 2,000 meters.
Papua New Guinea has a population of about 4.5 million people, which is among the most diverse on earth. Some 600 distinct languages are recognized and there are clear ethnic differences between the people of different areas. The population is scattered throughout the country with the biggest concentrations in the fertile valleys of the Highland and in the vicinity of major urban centers of Port Moresby, Lae, Madang and Rabaul. The practical density of the population on usable land is about 62 persons per square kilometer. Most of the rural population lives a semi-subsistence lifestyle with an estimated 75% of rural households selling at least part of their produce for cash.
Staple crops vary according to climate but the root crops of taro, cassava and yams are most common. Sago is the staple in northwestern coastal areas. All these crops have long growing periods that are further extended in the low temperature areas of the highlands.
The social indicators for Papua New Guinea are low. Life expectancy at birth is 56.8 years with an infant mortality rate of 61 per 1,000 live births. 87% of school age boys and 67% of school age girls enter primary school, but numbers drop drastically later with only 16% of boys and 11% of girls entering secondary education and about 2% entering tertiary education. Health indicators are particularly poor. There are 1.8 doctors for every 10,000 people and only 40% of children are immunized against measles. About 22% of the population has access to sanitation while 28% has access to safe, clean water.
Independent since 1974, Papua New Guinea is a parliamentary democracy governed by a single parliamentary house in Port Moresby. There is considerable volatility in the Parliament where changing alliances between small groups can quickly alter the balance of power. The provinces have assemblies made up of the elected national members of Parliament from the province, elected heads of local governments within the province, and certain appointed members.
The country has many natural resources. Mining has recently become the largest source of export income and forestry; oil and gas are increasingly important although agriculture remains important. The country is relatively poor, as exploitation and poor administration have meant that the resources have not brought the growth and development that might legitimately have been expected.
The geography of the country severely limits movement, particularly on the mainland. Port Moresby has no road links to any of the provincial capitals. The key roads are the Highlands Highway, which links the second city of Lae to the Highlands, and a second national highway that links Lae with the north coast at Madang and continues west along the coast until it becomes indistinct between Aitape and the Sandaun Provincial capital, Vanimo. Air and sea transport are important and there are still people who are familiar with aircraft but have never seen a motor vehicle.
Hazards
Papua New Guinea is at risk from a wide range of natural hazards all of which can have a significant impact on the daily life of the population and on the economy. The rural population accepts the impact of the hazards as part of daily life in a culture in which the struggle for existence is often difficult. The major meteorological hazards are severe storms and floods (which may also cause landslides), drought, tropical cyclones and frost. The country is also prone to geological hazards, including earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes, of which 14 are currently considered active. The common developing country disease and transport hazards also exist, as do industrial and mining hazards and there are risks to crops from pests and plant diseases.
Disaster Management Organization
The Disaster Management Act is the basic disaster management document in Papua New Guinea. It describes the basic disaster management structure and responsibilities and requires disaster plans to be prepared. The National Disaster Committee meets regularly, and since 1997 has been paying increased attention to disaster preparedness and mitigation matters. Provincial disaster committees exist in all provinces, although some are only marginally effective.
The National Disaster Management Plan was prepared in 1987, but has not been amended despite many changes to government and administrative arrangements. An updated plan has been drafted and is currently being discussed by the government and other agencies involved.
The National Disaster Management Office has the only full-time disaster management staff in the country. The office performs secretariat and administrative activities on behalf of the National Disaster Management Committee and runs the National Emergency Operations Center. It also coordinates disaster preparedness measures and prepares and distributes the National Disaster Plan.
Papua New Guinea lacks an effective system for collecting, organizing, analyzing and disseminating disaster management information between the government, the public or external agencies. In 1997 the only hazard warnings were for tropical cyclones; there was no formal system for reporting hazard impacts on any part of the country, and there was irregular contact between the key disaster management agencies and departments. Little baseline information is collected so comparisons with normal times are difficult. Even records of past disasters are poor and hard to trace.
The disaster management system is underdeveloped and under-resourced. This situation is about to change, as a five-year Australian-funded development program is due to begin in 2001.
El Niño and Papua New Guinea
Situated close to the normal warm water pool of the southwest Pacific, Papua New Guinea can be seriously, and quickly, affected by El Niño events. Historically, the most common direct effect of the eastward movement of the warm water pool appears to be reduced cloud cover as a result of decreased convection. This results in lower rainfall over much of the country and this can cause drought in the worst affected areas. Reduced cloud cover also allows faster cooling of the land overnight. In the highlands, this increases the number of frost days above 2,200 meters and allows the frosts to extend to lower altitude areas that rarely experience frost conditions. It may also be surmised that the severity of the frosts at any particular altitude increases but this is impossible to confirm in the absence of temperature records.
The reduced rainfall and higher frost rate can lead to water shortages, crop losses and famine. These increase the vulnerability of the human population to disease and dry the vegetation making it more vulnerable to fire. Surviving vegetation is weakened and, in turn, becomes vulnerable to pest and disease attack. The longer the impact lasts, the longer the recovery period appears to be.
Climate Records. Much of the limited historic climate information has to be drawn from available meteorological records (most of which are still on paper), colonial government and mission records, newspaper articles and personal histories. These indicate that major droughts occurred in parts of Papua New Guinea in 1896, 1902, 1914, 1941, 1972 and 1982 with less severe events in other years. All of these years had periods during which the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) was negative but negative values of 20 or more are only recorded for 1896, 1941, 1982-83 and 1997-98. The droughts of 1902, 1914 and 1972 coincided with much smaller negative SOI values although the first two did occur when the index had been negative for long periods. There are obviously a variety of factors that influence the occurrence of major drought in Papua New Guinea.
El Niño Research in Papua New Guinea. In the colonial period there was growing scientific interest in the occurrence of drought in Papua New Guinea, particularly after the 1972 drought. International developments in the identification and study of the El Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) relationship were mentioned in drought research in the 1970s and 80s, the most comprehensive published records of this research being published in the journal Mountain Research and Development (Volume 9, No. 3) of August 1989, edited by Bryant Allen, Harold Brookfield and Yvonne Byron and published by the UNU International Mountain Society in Boulder, Colorado.
With few indigenous scientists, Papua New Guinea has lacked the resources to maintain the momentum of research since independence, and only isolated work has continued – mainly within government agencies. None of the work appears to have been published but there is increasing experience that is being enhanced by frequent contact with Australian and other researchers.
Since the 1997-98 El Niño-related drought, the National Weather Office has been conducting low-level research on the possibility of predicting serious drought by comparing the accumulated total rainfall in previous wet seasons at Daru, in Western Province, with year-to-date rainfall readings. It is possible that examination of this relationship permits the prediction of dry seasons fairly accurately.
Overseas El Niño Research Relevant to Papua New Guinea. Australian scientists have continued to study the geography, agriculture, meteorology and other relevant subjects in Papua New Guinea since independence, often with Australian government funding. A key institution that has fostered this research is the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.
The Australian Bureau of Meteorology, which has a close relationship with the Papua New Guinea National Weather Office, has also conducted research over many years on weather and climate issues in the region. New Zealand's National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research has also conducted extensive research into tropical cyclone occurrence in the Southwest Pacific including the influence of the Southern Oscillation and sea surface temperature on cyclones.
The 1997-98 ENSO Event
Drought. The National Weather Service of Papua New Guinea, which has limited human and material resources and is significantly under-funded, has only a limited climate monitoring capability. Monthly rainfall figures are recorded at 21 stations around Papua New Guinea but only 12 stations maintain continuous daily records. These are forwarded monthly (sometimes with delays) to the climate section of the National Weather Office for processing when staff is available. Spasmodic reports from the other 9 stations provide useful information on trends in their areas.
The weather service, in common with the rest of the government, became aware of a developing drought from media and provincial government reports. Media reports of power reductions caused by reduced water flows in hydroelectric systems, increases in the price of fresh produce in markets, and mine production losses due to low water levels in the Fly River do not seem to have alarmed authorities. There are often drought periods from April to September and there appears to have been no early recognition that this was an exceptional event or that it might be linked to the El Niño. It was not until August 1997 that a National Weather Service staff member returning from studies overseas could be spared to examine El Niño reports from overseas and national rainfall records and prepare a report on El Niño and the reported drought and severe frosts for the government.
The first measurable effect on Papua New Guinea of the 1997-98 El Niño event appears to have been in March 1997 when there was low rainfall at nine of the twelve official weather stations, including all those situated on mainland New Guinea. While most of the country receives high to very high rainfall distributed fairly evenly through the year, periods of up to two months of lower rainfall are not unusual. When below-average rainfall was being recorded at all except one of the stations in April, May, and June, there was only local concern. Above-average rainfall was recorded at a few stations during July (reportedly as a result of short-term events) and in one station in August but this was not enough to relieve the developing drought, which continued for the rest of the year. Notable examples include Tabubil, with one of the highest rainfalls in the country, which received 78.6 mm in August compared to an average of 684.3 mm; and Port Moresby which recorded no rain in August, October and November and only 7.8 mm in September (compared with an average of about 164 mm for this period). Only near Wewak on the north coast of New Guinea was regular rain recorded, although the rainfall for the period from August 1997 to January 1998 was below average.
Nationwide, needed rain started to fall in January 1998 and by early April most stations were recording significant rainfall. The increase caused flooding in some areas, including the Ramu valley, during March and April.
Frost. As there are no weather-recording stations in the frost-prone zone above 2,100 meters, all reports of frost over this period are anecdotal but it is clear from these reports that there was an increase in the number and severity of frosts with some periods in which frost was experienced over a number of successive nights – a most unusual occurrence. Subsequent research indicates that frosts occurred above 2,200 meters in the Western Highlands as early as June 1997 and were experienced in every month until at least October. At Tabubil in September 1997, there were eight successive nights of frost in an area that normally experiences only occasional frosts.
Fire. A secondary result of the El Niño drought and frost was the increased incidence of bush fires in mainland New Guinea. The first fires were probably started by landowners burning off vegetation to clear land for new crops when rain returned. Some of these fires got out of control in the unusually dry conditions and spread far beyond the originally planned areas. Later fires are reported to have been lighted by landowners who believed that smoke would bring clouds, which would bring rain. By the time these fires were lit, the vegetation was even drier, so they often spread further and the calm atmospheric conditions left much of mainland shrouded in smoke and haze.
Alarm. The Papua New Guinea government became alarmed in early August 1997, as it received reports of drought from around the country and of severe frosts in the Highlands. The August report from the National Weather Service confirmed that serious drought existed in Milne Bay and Western Provinces but rainfall records from most other provinces were late. The report also states that rainfall in the New Guinea Islands was only marginally below normal while the Wewak rainfall figures were taken to indicate that the drought hardly affected the northern provinces.
Initial Impact Reports. By September 1997, reports from the Departments of Health, Provincial Affairs and Local Government, provincial authorities, churches and the media covering all nineteen provinces revealed food and water shortages, power rationing, school and health clinic closures, and outbreaks of disease linked to the use of brackish or untreated water or to dust and smoke inhalation. Subsistence farmers were already searching for "famine" foods in some areas, and people were traveling long distances to obtain water for drinking and cooking.
The Drought Assessments
The reports from around the country did not give a clear picture of the national situation nor did they indicate the priority areas for response assistance. In mid-September, the government asked Australia to assist by mounting an urgent national assessment of the situation. A team led by two scientists with long experience in the country was deployed and a rapid first assessment questionnaire covering the impact of the drought and frost on the priority sectors of food and agriculture, water and health was prepared.
Thirteen assessment teams, made up mainly of staff from the Department of Agriculture and Livestock, carried out the assessment between 25 September and 11 October. The teams visited a representative selection of villages in all provinces and returned a total of 638 questionnaires. Team members were asked to use personal observation as well as discussions with villagers to complete one questionnaire for each village visited. To provide a measure of standardization, teams were asked to complete the questionnaire by making an objective assessment of the situation in each village and by allocating a category on the basis of a five-point scale. The scale was as follows:
- Unusually dry, but no major food supply, drinking water or health problems.
- Some inconvenience. Staple food is short but other food available; must travel further to collect drinking water but health is okay.
- Difficult, with food short and some famine food being eaten, water available at a distance, some babies and old people unwell. No lives at risk.
- No food in gardens, famine food only being eaten, water in short supply and possibly polluted, increasing sickness, the lives of small children and old people at risk.
- Extreme situation. No food available at all, water very short, many people ill, small children and old people dying.
These summary ratings were quickly entered into a database and the results were mapped on a Geographical Information System. This enabled the most critical areas to be identified easily and priority areas for response agreed upon.
The assessment indicated that about 77,000 people were in a life-threatening situation due to food shortages and a further 100,000 were expected to be in that situation by the end of October 1997. If the rain did not return, a further 250,000 people were expected to enter the critical category in November and another 170,000 in December. The assessment also showed that at least 100,000 people were experiencing critical water shortages, some in places where there were food shortages as well, but many in places where food was still available.
The health situation was harder to assess because the health status of rural people in Papua New Guinea is already poor by international standards and because the health system had been allowed to run down in the previous few years. The teams reported an increase in diarrhea and skin infections but no widespread deterioration in the already poor nutritional status of young children. Although some deaths were reported, these could not be linked directly to the drought.
The reports also confirmed a reported migration from high to lower altitudes. The fertile high valleys were originally settled from lower levels and the people who live in the valleys maintain kinship or "wonto" relationships with others who live at lower levels. Downhill migration during hard seasons is a regular occurrence so some displacement was expected. In 1997 the migration was greater than usual.
The reported water shortages were confirmed by the teams and by a water expert who visited a number of provinces. He found 7 islands with no fresh water where people were drinking from coconuts or brackish water from beach springs and wells. The supply of coconuts was diminishing on some islands including one with a population of 1,000 people. He found only three other islands where people had the UN refugee camp standard of 15 liters of water per person per day. Some people were traveling by canoe to the nearest water point to collect water; others were walking as far as several kilometers to obtain water from distant creeks, beach springs and cave pools. Even this water was not always fresh. The expert was particularly concerned that there was insufficient water for hygiene purposes and forecast that this could lead to increasing health problems.
The Second Assessment. After the first assessment was completed, it was agreed that further assessments would be needed to monitor developments. A second assessment was conducted between 25 November and 12 December 1997. 18 teams were deployed and achieved better coverage than the first survey. A shorter questionnaire was used, which required assessment teams to consider a number of factors and provide a written assessment of the situation. Teams were asked to provide separate assessment categories to describe the severity of the food crisis and the water crisis.
This assessment indicated that almost 1.24 million people, 40% of the rural population, had little or no food available while about 410,000 people either had very limited supplies of contaminated water or had to collect water of variable quality for long distances. Although some rain had fallen in November and December, it had not made a significant difference to water supplies in badly affected highland provinces and had made no difference to food availability. Some replanting had been carried out but there was a critical shortage of planting material.
The teams reported an apparent increase in severe malaria and in diarrhea among people eating "famine" foods. There were more reports of people dying from unexplained symptoms and of an increase in deaths among young and middle-aged adults but the reports could not be confirmed.
The Third Assessment. Rain fell in many districts from December 1997 onwards but there were still areas of concern and a third assessment was carried out between 20 and 31 March 1998 by the Papua New Guinea Department of Agriculture and Livestock. It differed from the earlier assessments in covering only those areas identified as critical (Category 4 and 5) in earlier assessments, and in addressing recovery issues. 14 teams were deployed to visit 17 provinces and 244 census divisions.
The questionnaire used on this occasion asked specific questions relating to the amount of rain that had fallen and the needs of the people for both relief and recovery. Teams were again asked to categorize villages both at the time of the assessment and, if possible, in 2 months time.
This assessment identified more than 53,000 people still without food and another 336,000 experiencing serious shortages. The food situation was found to have improved considerably since the previous assessment with cultivation of staple crops underway and surplus supplies available in the markets in at least one island province. The number of people in the critical categories was expected to fall by at least 30% during the following two months with rapid recovery in most areas in later months. Shortages of seeds and other planting materials were still reported while crop recovery was also being affected by increasing insect pest attacks.
Water availability and quality had improved in most areas with only 75,000 people, many on atolls, now experiencing critical or serious shortages of safe water. As normal rainfall patterns returned, the remaining shortages were expected to ease before the onset of the normal dry season in May.
Once again, diarrhea was the main health problem reported, although the return of the rain had also brought an increase in mosquito numbers and further malaria outbreaks. There were also reports of increased malnutrition in some areas but the lack of baseline data made this difficult to confirm. The Department of Health lacked the resources to carry out a nutritional survey at any stage during or after the drought so reports of this nature remain subjective.
Other Impacts. The three assessments carried out between September 1997 and April 1998 concentrated on the impact of the drought and frost on rural communities. Urban communities were not subject to the same food shortages, but the variety of fresh produce available in markets was significantly reduced and prices increased. The prices of domestically sourced goods in trade stores also increased.
In the Papua New Guinea culture, kinship relationships are close and people who migrate to urban centers usually maintain close relationships with their home villages. In an event as serious as the drought, this kinship places obligations on people with resources to help those who are experiencing difficulties. Consequently, urban dwellers were obliged to send food or money to their rural "wontoks" to help them through the drought. This had an economic impact on urban-dwellers but reduced the effects of the drought on recipients.
Power Restrictions. A major impact on urban populations, particularly in the capital, Port Moresby, was the extent of power restrictions caused by a shortage of water for hydroelectric purposes. Port Moresby relies on a single reservoir for power and water. In April 1997 the reservoir contained more than 250 million cubic meters of water. The level fell steadily, and by November it contained only 80.9 million cubic meters – a reduction of some 66%. It was estimated that at current usage rates the dam would be empty by January 1998 if rain did not resume.
To reduce water use, load-shedding measures began in August 1997 but from 17 November the city was divided into two supply areas and each had power cut off for half of each working weekday. A schedule was published in the press and cuts were programmed alternately for the morning or afternoon of each day. This significantly reduced water usage and made it unnecessary to ration domestic water use. Public education campaigns encouraging people to save water were initiated.
Reservoir levels continued to fall and the government decided to reserve the water for domestic use when the reservoir reached a specified level. Before this level was reached, some older generators were repaired and new generators began to be installed so the demands of the hydroelectric system fell. Although significant rain began falling in late December, replenishment of the reservoir took time, and it was not until April 1998 that rationing could be eased. Further easing was implemented in June 1998, and by the end of the year power had returned to normal. A new power station was opened in April 1999 to reduce the need for such drastic measures in the future.
Economic Impacts. On March 4 1998 the Treasury Minister advised Parliament that the country had lost 500 Million Kina (US$ 278 million) in foreign exchange reserves as a result of the prolonged drought. This was approximately 62% of the previous 800 million Kina reserve and left the country with only enough funds to cover the cost of two months of imports. The Minister highlighted the impact of the drought-induced closures of mines and stated that the minimal currency inflow from traditional export sources and the downturn in the timber industry had also contributed to the loss.
The long-term impact of the drought on agricultural exports is clear from a number of 1998 reports. Compared with 1997, coffee exports fell by 11.8%, cocoa exports by 32.9%, copra exports by 35.7% and palm oil exports by 22.6%. Only copra oil exports increased (by 9.5%) and this increase was accounted for by an increase in the delivery of copra to the mills.
The drought had a more direct effect on mineral exports. The most dramatic impact was the fall in the level of the Fly River, which is normally navigable for about 800 km up to the port of Kiunga, the supply port for the huge Ok Tedi mine in Western Province. The level fell so far in August 1997 that only canoes could move on the river. Not only could no ore be carried down to the river mouth for export but also supplies for the mine could not be brought in. Limited movement of barges on the river began in November but ore sales did not recommence until February 1998. Other mining operations in the country were also affected by water shortages.
Social Impacts. The social impacts of the El Niño event are difficult to confirm in the absence of any study of the subject. The people worst affected by the drought and frosts were subsistence farmers living a semi-subsistence lifestyle in the highland or island provinces. Their life is difficult and they often experience hardships that would alarm people used to an easier lifestyle even in the developing world. During the drought, many of these families survived on so-called "famine" foods, wild leaves, roots and animals that are not normally eaten. Searching for these foods is very time-consuming and the life became very hard but the people displayed great resilience, and recovery appears to have been faster than forecast by any of the assessments. The capability of some to survive the drought without any relief is shown by the fact that some villagers in a remote part of Central Province decided not to walk to the aid delivery point (which admittedly was some distance away) to collect supplies of rice and oil. Their condition is reported to have been little worse than that of communities that received relief supplies.
National Response. Some provincial and district administrations began to provide relief to specific communities in August 1997. Where a community or group of people were seen to be in serious difficulty and if funds were available, food was bought locally and delivered to the community for distribution. Usually the food was rice, available in bulk from traders in most parts of Papua New Guinea, and tinned fish or meat.
In early September the Papua New Guinea government allocated 4 million Kina (US$ 2.78 million) 1997 to provincial administrations to fund immediate relief to the worst affected areas. On 17 September, the government made a further K 20 million (US$ 13.9 million) available for relief. This sum was to be held in a trust account by the central government and used, as necessary, to fund relief activities. There were delays and the funds did not actually arrive in the account until late November, but once the announcement had been made, there was a public perception that there was plenty of money available and delays in providing relief were widely criticized.
As the results of the first assessment were examined, it was clear that it would be impossible to assist all affected people. The government agreed to give supplementary rations to those in areas assessed as being in Categories 4 and 5, i.e., whose lives were considered to be at risk. The scale of relief agreed upon was 8 kg of rice, 2 kg of wheat flour and 1 liter of oil per person per month to be delivered through provincial authorities to district authorities who would be responsible for distribution through village and community leaders.
In late September the Papua New Guinea and Australian governments agreed that Australia would deliver the relief to parts of the country that could not be accessed by road transport, while Papua New Guinea would make the road deliveries.
Because of the delay in transfer of the allocated funds to the Drought Trust Account, road deliveries did not start until late November 1997. Most of the government supplies were delivered to Lae, a major port and the terminus of the Highlands Highway.
International Response. The international response to the developing crisis was substantial. Australia, as the previous colonial power, made the largest contribution and had the highest profile but a wide range of donors made contributions to the relief operation. Soon after the first assessment report was completed Australia deployed C-130 Hercules and Caribou aircraft and various helicopters as well as naval landing craft to deliver assistance. Deliveries continued from late October 1997 to April 1998. Australia also contributed technical assistance, staff and medical support, consultancy services, non-government organization support and seeds and planting materials for recovery. By June 1998 a total of AU$30 million (US$19.5 million) had been provided.
The only other donor to provide and deliver direct food relief was France. French military aircraft from New Caledonia visited Papua New Guinea in December 1997 and delivered food over a period of about one week. Japan funded delivery of a large quantity of World Food Programme rice to Lae for the Papua New Guinea government's relief operation. Unfortunately, shipping delays meant that most rice arrived at a time when food shortages were easing.
Financial Assistance. Donors had provided US$803,000 cash to the Drought Trust Account by December 1997. This was considerably less than the government had sought, although the account was bolstered to some degree by donations from within the community.
Recovery Operations. As rain began to fall and vegetation recovered from the effects of El Niño, the priority was to obtain seeds and planting materials (usually tubers and cuttings) to enable people to start planting staple crops as quickly as possible. In drought-affected areas, most or all of the tubers and seeds that would normally have been saved for planting had been eaten or had been destroyed by bush fires, drought or frost. Some planting materials were located elsewhere in the country and more obtained from overseas. Frost and drought resistant varieties of the major staples that would be acceptable to the local communities were also sought. Particular attention was paid to obtaining tubers of the temperate potato (called the English or Irish potato in Papua New Guinea) for planting at higher altitudes. Seeds of fast-growing vegetable crops were also distributed. By the middle of 1998, when a tsunami struck in Sandaun Province, fresh food supplies from every province were available to be donated for relief assistance.
Post-Event Reviews. Three "lessons learned" workshops were held in Papua New Guinea during 1998. There was a consensus that although this was the worst and most prolonged drought and frost event to have struck the country in a century, the assessments overstated the seriousness of the situation. While some people were clearly in serious danger of starvation or dehydration, and many others were affected by lack of food or having to use unsafe or brackish water, the number in each of these situations was considered, with hindsight, to have been significantly lower than initially thought. There was agreement that the errors were acceptable in view of the limitations imposed by time, the lack of baseline information, the size of the area to be assessed, the uncertainty about population sizes and the inexperience of many members of the assessment teams.
The main lessons learned related to organizational matters. There was particular emphasis on the need for an effective disaster management system to be developed throughout Papua New Guinea. It was felt that if such a system could be developed, involving both government and non-government organizations likely to have a role in mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities, many of the problems experienced in the El Niño response would not have been so severe. It was also considered that there was a need to develop better weather monitoring mechanisms and information management systems, backed by comprehensive baseline data collections, and public education and awareness capabilities. Steps are already being taken to implement these lessons.
Lessons Learned
A number of lessons were learned from the impact of the 1997-98 El Niño event on Papua New Guinea. Implementation of some of these has begun but others await the completion of an emergency management development package that has been discussed with Australia in 1999-2000. Major lessons learned include the need for the following:
Emergency Management
- An emergency management structure with agreed roles and responsibilities that extend from Cabinet level down through national, provincial and district to village level that encompasses not only the official sector but also the non-government organization and the business sector.
- Comprehensive updated national disaster plans that are regularly exercised, tested and reviewed to meet changing threats, administrative arrangements and requirements. These plans should include supporting plans, not only at the provincial and district levels, but also in the various specialist sectors including health, transport, agriculture and water.
- A comprehensive training program for all those involved in emergency and disaster management.
- A standardized, trustworthy and auditable approach to dealing with funds donated by the public and by donors after a disaster.
- A standardized disaster impact assessment system with teams trained in its use.
- Arrangements under which funds for response operations can be made available quickly in an emergency.
Hazard Monitoring
- A review of current hazard-monitoring capabilities and procedures and development of improved systems that will provide early warning of developing threats and regularly updated information on their characteristics and progress.
- A system that ensures that the warnings reach the right people in a timely manner.
- Agreed to and widely promulgated arrangements for communicating threat information to the general public accompanied by appropriate background information and action recommendations.
Public Information and Education
- Public education about the hazards that threaten Papua New Guinea, their origins, causes and characteristics.
- Community education programs, using a variety of channels, that advise the population of the appropriate protective measures to take to protect itself from the hazards that may threaten it.
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
- National hazard and vulnerability analysis followed by a risk management process that identifies the most appropriate management strategies to reduce the impact of the various threats.
- Collection of baseline information that will enable the impact of hazards to be forecast and, if necessary, monitored to enable the most appropriate prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery actions to be taken.
- Greater attention to be paid to the maintenance of existing infrastructure so that it is better able to meet the requirements of the population in an emergency.
- A coordinated approach to dealing with the water supply needs of both rural and urban populations.
- Supplementing the existing power-generation arrangements to keep pace with increasing public and commercial needs in all population centers.
Information Management
Particular attention needs to be paid to the management of information in relation to hazards and disasters. This requires the definition of channels for collection, organization, analysis and distribution of information and the delegation of appropriate responsibilities. It will require an information-management structure that extends from the top to the bottom of society and provides for a two-way flow of information with a change in culture that encourages an understanding of the information needs of others and a willingness to share information for the greater good. There is also a need for improved communications systems between national, provincial and district level disaster managers that will continue to be available in an emergency.
