Philippines Country Case Study:
Impacts and Responses to the 1997-98 El Niño Event
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Executive Summary
The main purpose of the project was to enhance the understanding of El Niño issues through a review of current early warning and preparedness systems in national, regional and global contexts; and through an assessment of the vulnerability of various socio-economic sectors and the information needs of decision makers in these sectors. Based on the assessment and the review, the project yielded preliminary guidelines for regional and national preparedness for El Niño events and their impacts. It also served to spark interest in initiating programs for capacity building for the international, academic, scientific communities and the media.
Socio-Economic Setting
The Philippines, located in Southeast Asia, is an archipelago of 7,107 islands. It is home to 76 million people and is one of the most populous countries in Asia and the world.1 While most of the population still reside in the rural areas, urban migration has increased steadily. In 1996, the total urban population constituted 55% of the total national population. Metro Manila, with its continued influx of rural migrants, has become a very densely populated place, more crowded that Metro Tokyo or Metro Paris according to various studies. About 13% of the country's population resides within Manila's limited land area, representing a mere 0.2% of the country's total land area.
From 1991 to 1996, economic indicators reflected national growth. Since 1991, the Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been on upward trends. In 1996, GNP grew to 6.9% and GDP to 5.7%. Despite the financial crisis of 1997, GNP registered 5.8% and GDP 5.1%.
In 1998, according to a report by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)2 GNP grew by 0.1 percent. Meanwhile, GDP declined by 0.5 percent. The strong growth (12.9% of net factor incomes from abroad, which accounted for the difference between GNP and GDP) enabled overall output to achieve positive growth. The GDP contraction in 1998 was caused by the 6.6% drop in agricultural production, and the decline in construction and construction-related manufacturing by 9.5 percent. El Niño caused negative impacts on agricultural outputs in the first three-quarters of 1998. Palay, as well as other cash crops like coconut and sugarcane posted double-digit declines in the fourth quarter.
The country's Human Development Index (HDI) ranked 98th (out of 174 countries), according to the UNDP's World Development Report 1998, ranking lower than China, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Poverty remains to be the country's biggest problem with more than one-third of its people living below the poverty line. A disparity in the country's human development has also been noted in the different regions' HDI ratings: Metro Manila ranks the highest and the southernmost regions, the lowest. The figures indicate unequal growth from improvements in the economy over the last ten years. Per capita income figures also show disparity in wealth and in development distribution in the Philippines, with Metro Manila residents earning so much more than residents of other areas.3
Life expectancy in the Philippines increased from 66.5 to 68 years during the period 1992 to 1997. Basic health indicators have also improved. Communicable diseases such as acute respiratory infections showed a downward trend, as did the incidence of diseases associated with unsafe water supply and poor sanitation. Leprosy and malaria have ceased to be major public health problems.
The Philippines is vulnerable to many natural hazards. It is affected by tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions, El Niño and La Niña episodes, earthquakes, tsunamis, droughts and floods. The worst of these disasters have caused the loss of human lives, homes and livelihoods, and resulted in economic disruptions in billions of Philippine pesos. In the last decade alone, the world witnessed the impacts on lives and property of a large number of Filipino communities because of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991, the earthquake in 1990, and the Leyte-Ormoc flash flooding in 1991.
The government responds to these climate-related impacts through at least eight (8) major mechanisms. One such mechanism is the National Disaster and Coordinating Council (NDCC) of the Department of National Defense. This acts as the lead coordinating agency tasked to prepare for and respond to disaster situations. It partners with the Department of Science and Technology through the Philippine Institute of Vulcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) and the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) in delivering timely information to other government agencies, particularly the local governments, for their quick response.
The 1997-98 El Niño Event
In anticipation of the 1997-98 El Niño, Filipino scientists and officials monitored the occurrence of known climatic indicators of ENSO such as the following: the delayed onset of the rainy season, weak monsoon activity, weak tropical cyclone activity, and less than average number of tropical cyclones entering the Philippine Area of Responsibility. Areas of vulnerability were identified and classified according to low, moderate and high.
Tracing and Assessing the flow of information on the 1997-98 El Niño. PAGASA provided early warning about El Niño as of 1995;4 the first drought advisory in May 1997; and from May onwards, provided a monthly weather outlook to the Inter-Agency Committee for Crisis Water Management, and to the Presidential Task Force El Niño. A presidential directive sent out to government agency heads in June 1997, enforced the monitoring of the development of El Niño closely. This resulted in concrete plans by key agencies to respond to the event.
The country also cooperated with international initiatives and sent a delegation to "The Asian Regional Meeting on El Niño-Related Crises" to discuss a regional climate outlook and opportunities for international cooperation in managing and reducing the effects of El Niño.
The print and broadcast media gave wide coverage of El Niño. This coverage could be classified in three stages: first, projecting impacts and identifying vulnerable areas, giving information and advice to the public about how to cope with the effects; second, reporting the actual impacts as they happened, and monitoring the responses of the disaster coordinating councils and local governments; third, in retrospect, providing analysis and assessment on the effectiveness of government interventions. Media itself received a brief assessment of their own role in reporting El Niño, specifically media's uncritical reporting of conflicting figures on damages.
Teleconnections (i.e., expected effects of El Niño)
Scientists have observed El Niño's teleconnections in the country to be strong. While more studies on El Niño are needed, existing research indicates that changes in rainfall pattern associated with El Niño, temperature fluctuations and wind fluctuations have impacted on the country's water resources, coastal resources, forests and people's health.
The 1997-98 climate-related physical and social impacts of the 1997-98 El Niño in the country. The 1997-1998 El Niño struck as the country was enjoying a continuous four-year growth. The effects and impacts of the 1997-98 El Niño episode were significant in the areas of physical environment (including water supply and forest/bush fires), health, and on economic aspects (reduced productivity and revenue for agriculture, reduced hydroelectric power).
- On the Environment
Weather. El Niño caused a dry spell between June and October 1997 and this lingered until June 1998. Drought affected 68 percent of the country, compared to only 28 percent in 1972 and 16 percent in 1982. El Niño dissipated in July-August 1998. Its effects, however, continued to be felt through mid-September (i.e., delayed tropical cyclone activity, recorded rainfall fell into the less-than-10-percentile rank).
Water supply. Both urban and rural households in many parts of the country experienced a dwindling water supply. The lack of rain affected water reservoirs dependent on surface water sources. The multipurpose Angat Dam, servicing Metro Manila and environs, reached critically low levels so that the government's Metropolitan Manila Water Supply and Sanitation (MWSS) enforced drastic conservation measures such as the following: reduction of water supply by approximately 10 percent; shortened water service by four hours daily; repaired leaks and sanctioned water users with illegal connections. Water for irrigation of some 27,000 hectares of rice and corn paddies in one province was cut off, affecting 15,000 farmer households that lost an estimated 100,000 metric tons of rice.
Forest/Bush Fires. A total of 9,400 hectares of second growth and/or logged over forest burned in 1997-98, including 70 pockets of forest fires in Palawan province, home to some endangered species. Estimated cost of damage was P 150 million pesos. No virgin forests were reported to have been affected.
- On Social/Health Aspects
With the lack of drinking water and the prevalence of unsanitary hygiene conditions, communities were prone to communicable diseases. The extreme heat added to the deterioration of people's health. Outbreaks of malaria, dengue or H-fever, diarrhea and cholera were reported by early 1998. Acute malnutrition was prevalent among indigenous peoples.5 There were 72 reported deaths; 42 people had died of food poisoning from eating root crops not well-prepared for human consumption.6
- On Economic Aspects
In the second quarter of 1998, the Philippine economy registered a GDP growth rate of only 1.2 percent as compared to a GDP growth rate of 5.6 percent over the same period in the previous year, reported NEDA. It was the economy's worst performance since 1992. However, the El Niño event was not solely to blame as the Asian financial crisis contributed to its negative effects.
Reduced productivity and revenues. The country's aggregate agricultural output dropped. In the first half of 1998, production shrunk by 7.15 percent of the target, considered the lowest in 20 years. Rice and corn production, respectively, declined by 43.6 percent and 26.6 percent of average production during the period.7 Coconut production was cut by 10 percent.8 The Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation9 reported a 21% dip in rice insurance enrollment from P 1.4 billion in 1996 to P 1.1 billion in 1997 but reported increase in insurance enrollment by corn farmers and farmers of drought resistant crops. PCIC believes that this was attributed to El Niño.
Fisheries incurred P 7.24 billion in losses as of November 1998. El Niño led to dried ponds, constricted production cycles, stunted growth and high mortality rates caused by stress, disease and poor water conditions.10
Reduced hydroelectric power. The small hydropower plants were the hardest hit by El Niño. The Department of Energy reported that from a high of almost 19 percent of total power generation from hydropower plants in 1992, its share went down to only 1 percent of total in 1998.11 A corresponding increase in thermal plant operation was estimated at an additional consumption of 313,145 to 439,363 barrels of fuel oil.12
Responses
The government responded by creating Task Force El Niño. This inter-agency body sought a better planning and implementation approach to be effective. With a comprehensive action plan drawn up, the Task Force sought an initial budget of P 80 million to support a full-blown tri-media campaign. Within different agencies, other budgets were allocated for El Niño-related projects.
The work program of the Task Force focused on interventions in agriculture, domestic water supply, environment and other sectors (health, energy), and on the information/education/communication campaign.
- Agriculture
The government worked on the rehabilitation of communal/national irrigation systems; construction of small farm reservoirs; purchase/installation of shallow tube wells; small water-impounding dams; providing direct assistance to farmers; cloud-seeding operations; and research and development projects.
- Domestic water supply
The government identified and closely monitored 26 vulnerable areas and six major dams; prioritized projects worth P 7 million for critical local water districts and for acquisition of water tankers to service locations dependent on surface water sources;13 The National Disaster Coordinating Council provided P 200 million from the Calamity Fund for the projects of the Action Plan (drilling of 20 new wells, rehabilitation of 53 existing wells, acquisition of 72 stationary tankers and 9 mobile tankers; purchase of chlorinators, etc.).
- Environment
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) launched a massive tri-media campaign against slash-and-burn farming (kaingin) and the prevention of grassland and forest fires in conjunction with the Philippine Information Agency. The DENR employed a 3,326-strong team of forest fighters to protect over 15.9 million hectares of forest land.
- Health Sector
The Department of Health implemented an intensive health education campaign on personal hygiene, proper storage of water, among other activities.
- Information/Education/Communication (IEC) Campaign
The communication strategy involved all government agencies in the IEC campaign. For example, the Department of Interior and Local Government conducted community education sessions through Water Sanitation task forces. The Philippine Council for Agriculture Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCARRD), the research arm of the Task Force El Niño, conducted trainings/seminars, and policy advocacy meetings. The Philippine Information Agency (PIA) provided news bulletins and carried out its own full-blown campaign in both rural and urban centers.
Outside of the government response, the private sector provided aid to at least 985,000 families through the Tabang Mindanaw campaign. As an informal collaboration of Catholic Church dioceses, non-government organizations, corporate foundations, media and the Mindanao Presidential Action Group, the group quickly used its existing network in affected local areas to provide relief assistance to tribal communities. It effectively mobilized more than 8,000 volunteers to assist in rice distribution and medical missions, and solicited cash resources amounting to P 92 million for the benefit of 255,000 tribal families.14
Forecasting by Analogy
Timing of Information Dissemination. PAGASA's early advisories on El Niño received full government attention following a memo of then President Ramos to the Cabinet Secretaries of Environment and Agriculture and following the conduct of the National Caucus on the El Niño Phenomenon. The dissemination of information on El Niño increased significantly with the creation of the Task Force El Niño, aided by an allocation of funds for an intensive information education and communication (IEC) campaign. Because of a very dynamic local media industry that also covered international news extensively (e.g., CNN, BBC), information about El Niño was abundant.
Quality of Information. While the flow of information was abundant, the quality of information being disseminated needed improvement, to wit:
- Messages needed to be corrected such as those linking El Niño with global warming, giving conflicting information on the beginning and end of the drought, relating global impacts of drought in the Philippine context, and notifying high-risk planting dates as low-risk planting dates.
- Two public surveys15 reflected the people's increasing knowledge about El Niño and what they could do as it affected them. However, people rated as low the government's actions to inform and prepare vulnerable sectors.
The National Disaster Coordinating Council assessed the government's difficulties related to information flow as:16
- The lack of a monitoring system and information dissemination by local disaster coordinating councils
- Non-compliance of local government units with the proper channel of reporting, so that feedback to higher-level Disaster Coordinating Councils was not sustained, irregular and delayed
- Non-synchronization of disaster assessment reports
- Lack of communication and transportation facilities
The above difficulties contributed to the government's weak response to vulnerable areas in the southern Philippines, areas that had not originally been identified as prone to the effects of El Niño.
The development and implementation of an effective set of actions to minimize the impacts of El Niño may have been unintentionally prohibited by the following factors: perception, policy, and vulnerability assessment and decision-making.
Perception. To most Filipinos, a severe drought scenario seemed improbable. Thus, actions were taken only when clear and obvious manifestations of drought already prevailed. But these actions were limited by the availability of economic resources that are constantly stretched to the limit by the occurrence of frequent disasters. Coupled with competing budget priorities, advocates for increased resources for disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness have found it a big challenge to convince policy makers to increase investments in order to minimize the likely impacts of El Niño.
Many Filipinos also perceive that the national government has to provide the solutions and resources to disasters, although local and community-based solutions are also effective in minimizing the impacts of El Niño.
Policy. Prior to the El Niño 1997-98 episode, the general public and most government administrators had fully accepted that pre-disasters actions (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, or PMP) are better than post-disaster actions (relief and rehabilitation). However, the national calamity and disaster preparedness plans and policy still prohibit the implementation of effective PMP programs. For instance, funds for disaster-related programs can only be allocated upon a declaration of a state of calamity by the national and/or local government.
The current policy also needs to be supported by a Contingency Plan specific to a particular type of hazard such as the El Niño. Although it has wide coverage in terms of scope (perhaps the most extensive disaster-related policy in Southeast Asia), hazard-specific responses require further elaboration in the document.
Vulnerability Assessment and Decision Making. The basis for deciding responses had been the climate map at the onset of El Niño. The climate map, however, provided static information of climate, distinguishing wet and dry season months in a very broad sense. Vulnerability on the other hand is a multi-dimensional issue encompassing several factors like the quantum of rainfall; distribution of rainfall over space and time; status of irrigation; socio-economic features and others. An improved vulnerability map that includes the information above will greatly enhance better decision-making and action.
Lessons Learned
The three most important lessons (among other lessons) learned in the Philippines case study on the 1997-98 El Niño are as follows:
Political will and policy articulation is important. The involvement of the Philippine President in articulating clearly what needed to be done by two of the country's important sectors – agriculture and environment – ensured the accomplishments of various sectors in minimizing the adverse impacts of El Niño.
The constitution of a Task Force (a multi-sectoral and coordinative body involving the highest officials of agencies) is a strategic response. The Task Force El Niño yielded a comprehensive plan that included forewarning, education, and strategic solutions such as the adoption of an integrated approach to water resource management through a decentralized, participatory and community-based approach. However, the Task Force must be supported by a national forum of sectoral experts that may provide ongoing guidance to it. This will enhance technical input to major decision making.
Extensive information dissemination about El Niño to a wider stakeholders' body and public involvement in El Niño responses are needed. In the Philippine experience, it is remarkable that the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) campaign had changed the people's perceptions toward El Niño and its association to drought conditions. However, information dissemination must cover all vulnerable sectors. In the Philippines, this should have covered upland dwellers, fisheries and indigenous Filipinos, and not just urban dwellers and a few selected sectors (agriculture, environment, and health); sector-specific information must be improved in order to communicate effectively.
Other lessons include the following:
In providing an early warning of El Niño's onset or impacts, the value of long-lead forecasts in alleviating social and economic costs must be emphasized. This must be supported by an agro-climatic, map-based vulnerability mapping. This process must improve the usability of seasonal forecasts in agriculture (by providing the type climate information needed and used in various stages of agriculture operations).
Local contingency plans for agriculture should include a "conflict resolution mechanism" to ensure equity in the distribution of irrigation water, intervening in water markets to minimize exploitation, and aggressively promoting campaigns for taking advantage of the moisture availability in order to cultivate short-duration crops.
Agricultural projects should be consulted and planned with the farmers to ensure that they will be appropriate and useful interventions. The financial allocation for such projects should come in a timely manner. Otherwise, delays in making funding available could derail the project.
Resources tend to flow to disaster preparedness faster when the president or the prime minister takes an interest in and sets up an interagency task force.
The simultaneous occurrence of other hazards can confound the ability of scientists to make reliable attributions about disaster impacts to El Niño events (e.g., Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991) of various societal impacts.
The Internet serves as a useful vehicle for keeping tabs on El Niño's development and impacts and for complementing national El Niño forecast efforts.
There is a need to target at-risk populations in advance of the impacts. Asian countries' ability or interest to respond to an El Niño forecast in 1997-98 was adversely affected by the economic meltdown in Asia.
Even with good forecasts and with appropriate response strategies, an El Niño event will still cause some level of impacts. Impacts cannot be reduced to 'zero'.
A high level of transparency with regard to warnings and discussion of El Niño and its possible impacts on the Philippines generated a high level of awareness of what people should expect El Niño's impacts to be.
There is a need for more accurate forecasts of El Niño and of its impacts as well in order to improve societal responses.
Funds should flow more quickly than in the past to areas that are expected to be or are already affected. The mechanisms for the delivery of such emergency funds should be re-evaluated in light of the 1997-98 El Niño event.
There is a need for an improved communication and monitoring system and for the effective dissemination of warnings.
El Niño exacerbates other known disasters in the country, but the different disasters are viewed as having varying levels of importance (e.g., droughts are considered worse than floods).
Local communities cannot depend on the national government for assistance during an El Niño. They must also rely on their own efforts.
In the Philippine case, a disaster had to be declared before emergency assistance could be rendered. However, this precluded agency preparations for the impacts of an El Niño.
El Niño must be considered in medium- and long-term development planning processes and not just for short-term disaster planning.
Presidential involvement in an El Niño forecast or warning is an important asset when it comes to pro-acting in the face of an El Niño forecast.
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The Philippines' Initial National Communication on Climate Change, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 1999.
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UNDP Facts and Figures, sourced from the Internet, www.undp.com
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Alegre, Al (ed). Trends and Traditions, Challenges and Choices, Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Quezon City, 1996. p. 225
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Jose Aida, 1999: Retrospective of the 1997-98 El Niño Event in the Philippines. PAGASA.
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Ibid. p. 8
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Tabang Mindanaw Relief Campaign Reports. Tabang Mindanaw Secretariat. 1998.
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Jose, Aida. Retrospective of the 1997-98 El Niño Event in the Philippines, PAGASA, 1999. p 8.
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Food and Agribusiness Monitor 1998, Center for Food and Agribusiness, University of Asia and the Pacific.
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Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation, Annual Report 1997
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Ibid. p. 5
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Department of Energy. Annual Report 1997-1998. p.51
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Ibid
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These were located in Tagkawayan, Quezon; Malaybalay, Bukidnon; Surigao in Surigao City; Guinyangan in Quezon.
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Tabang Mindanaw brochure. Tabang Mindanaw Secretariat c/o Assissi Development Foundation, Mandaluyong City, 1999.
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Both by independent groups: the Philippine Information Agency and the Social Weather Station.
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Executive Summary re Comprehensive Assessment Report on El Niño Phenomenon in Mindanao Area, National Disaster Coordinating Council, Department of National Defense, Quezon City, 1998.
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