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Ecuador Country Case Study:
Impacts and Responses to the 1997-98 El Niño Event

Team Leader:     Dr. Pilar Cornejo-Grunauer     ESPOL (Escuela Superior Politécnica del       Litoral)     Campus Prosperina     PO Box 09-01-5863     Guayaquil, Ecuador Team Members:     Armando Gutiérrez-Espinoza (health specialist)     Alberto Compódonico (health specialist)     Mario Gómez (health specialist)     Maria de los Angeles-Gutiérrez (assistant)     Arturo Puchaichela (specialist on water and       environment)     Indira Nolivos (oceanography and environmental       science)     Juan C. Blum (environmental economist)     Patricia Urdiales (assistant)     Maria Cecilia Villalba (assistant)     Monica Barco (secretary)

Executive Summary

At the end of March 1997, anomalous conditions were present in both the tropical Pacific Ocean and the atmosphere. During May 1997, these anomalies and their patterns confirmed the development (onset) of an El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) event that lasted until June 1998. Its evolution (phases of development) was similar to other events, but its timing was different.

Information on the evolution of the 1997-98 El Niño and its probable impacts was disseminated as early as July 1997, based on the known impacts of the 1982-83 event. However, Ecuador's political instability – four presidents between 1996 and 1998 – took its toll when El Niño came in 1997, and Ecuadorians, in general, were not able to cope with its impacts.

When an El Niño occurrence of unknown magnitude and duration was announced by the Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral (ESPOL) 31 May 1997, the private and governmental sectors became alarmed. The governmental response was quick but not effective. On 2 July 1997, a national emergency was declared by the president, under the National Security Law, giving the National Civil Defense the power to coordinate any action to cope with El Niño. A contingency plan was approved in July of 1997. However, instead of following the law, a permanent committee for coordination of actions to cope with the El Niño phenomenon was formed and named Comité Para Enfrentar del Fenómeno de El Niño (COPEFEN). At the beginning, it was put under the office of the president but later, due to widespread information about the misuse of international funds, it was placed in the vice-president's office.

Several campaigns were launched to disseminate information about the potential impacts of El Niño on the areas of direct impact (the coastal plains west of the Andes), based on the impacts during the 1982-83 El Niño event. Some prevention campaigns, started as early as June 1997 and supported by the private and governmental sectors, were oriented toward impact mitigation as well as prevention.

The impact scenarios were provided by several organizations working on El Niño and its impacts. ESPOL provided impact scenarios for the socioeconomic sectors. The Instituto Oceanográfico de la Armada (INOCAR, the Naval Oceanographic Institute) provided scenarios for the coastal areas and beaches. And the Instituto Nacional de la Pesca (INP, the National Institute of Fisheries) provided scenarios for the fisheries. These organizations, along with the University of Guayaquil, the Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Marinas (CENAIM), the Catholic University of Guayaquil and others, are part of the Estudio Regional de Fenómeno El Niño (ERFEN, or the Regional Study of El Niño Phenomenon.)¹ After August 1997, each organization started providing biweekly reports to the government and the general public.

These impact scenarios could be developed because Ecuador is in the proverbial direct line of fire of El Niño. El Niño's impacts are felt directly when the Kelvin waves hit the western, equatorial coast of South America. Its physical effects from the 1982-83 El Niño, used as a forecasting analogue, are summarized below:

• Increase in oceanic temperatures: Local fisheries of small pelagic species declined and fishmeal prices increased. Other warm-water species replaced these species. Some birds and mammals that fed from this fishery, on the continental shelf and around the Galapagos Islands, starved to death. Coral reef bleaching was another adverse impact.
• Increase in rainfall along the coastal provinces during periods longer than the rainy season: Rainfall produced flooding, mudslides, infrastructure destruction, collapsed bridges, agricultural devastation and poor sanitary conditions which became health problems. Secondary impacts on the economy of these coastal provinces were also evident.
• Increase in sea level (due to Kelvin waves) which increased in activity and height due to storms in the northern Pacific: The higher sea level caused coastal erosion at the shoreline, destroying any structures near the beaches. It also caused problems for the artisanal fishing boats, a loss in tourism at the beaches, and an influx of debris to the beaches, such as dead animals and trees.

Socio-economic Impacts

According to the Instituto Nacional de Estudística y Censos (INEC), the National Institute for Census and Statistics), El Niño events had a strong impact on the coastal and island populations of Ecuador, which make up 50% of the country's inhabitants. It is also important to notice the relative youth of this affected population: during 1997-98, approximately 34% of those affected were younger than 15 years old. The most important impacts of the 1997-98 event (in millions of dollars) are summarized in Table 1.

Most of the flooded cities had problems with water supply, sewage, and damage to their infrastructures. Even though the affected urban population was larger, the rural populace suffered the most. The rural population remained isolated; the flooding destroyed their highways, bridges and roads, their lifelines to the cities. Much of their harvests and agricultural products were lost, raising market prices. Also, most of the rural communication and transport activities are done on third-level roads that, under Ecuadorian standards, are available only during the dry season.

Table 1: Impact of El Niño² (millions of US $)

(a) Social sector includes housing, health and education.

(b) Infrastructure sector includes water and sewage, energy and electricity, transportation and telecommunications, urban infrastructure.

(c) Economic sector includes agriculture, livestock and fisheries, industry, commerce and tourism.

Microeconomics

An analysis of price variability based on two indices that reflect the microeconomic impact – the index for producer prices (IPP),³ for the national level, and the index for the urban consumer (IPCU), for the coastal plain level – shows the following:

1. An increase in the IPCU due to an increase in the transport costs of goods in January 1998, caused by speculation about the duration of El Niño and whether there would be an increase in precipitation when the 1998 rainy season coincides with El Niño;
2. Political instability arose due to general elections for the president, vice-president, and congress, while a new constitution was debated, developed, and adopted.

When El Niño declined between June and August 1998, coastal highways remained rudimentary but still connected. The end of El Niño helped to normalize food distribution and to improve the transport of people and cargo between affected areas. The IPP fell in June 1998, while the IPCU had a speculative increase due to the second presidential round. By August 1998, El Niño's effects had almost disappeared from the Ecuadorian coast, while the chosen indices increased as they responded to the new government and its economic regime (NB: President Jamil Mahuad started his 4-year term in August 1998, lasting until 21 January 2000).

Fisheries and Aquaculture

Sardine (Sardinops sagax) landings were reduced drastically, while an increase was observed in Pacific anchoveta in chuhueco (Centengraulis mysticetus). But before drawing conclusions, the INP experts indicated that the effect of the sardine fleet's fishing closer than usual to the coast, in an area where chuhueco is usually predominant, must be taken into consideration. However, stocks of sardine and other pelagic species from Ecuador migrated southward toward the Peruvian-Chilean coast causing a reduction of 57% in total landings for 1997 (248,277 metric tons) with respect to 1996 (435,961 metric tons). As observed after previous El Niño events, a positive impact was an expectation for an increase in the recruitment of yellowfin tuna. This expectation was realized two years later, in 1999, resulting in large catches of tuna by the Latin American fleet. In the case of the shrimp industry, El Niño had both negative and positive effects. The most important positive effect was an increase of 40% in total exports during 1997 with respect to 1996.

Agriculture

These strong events negatively affected nearly all agricultural sectors and significantly affected those along the coast. Crop loss was due to the following problems:

• Lack of flowering: mango, asparagus, and melon;
• Excess humidity: only 50 million pounds (5.5%) of sugar cane were harvested out of the expected 900 million pounds;
• Flooding: rice, soy, banana, beans, vegetables, fruits, sugar cane, coffee and cacao;
• Transportation problems (collapsed highways and bridges): shipping bananas, a major export crop.

The total area affected by the phenomenon reached 613,000 ha (15% of the total agricultural land of the coastal area). The total amount of direct losses estimated in agriculture was US$524 million, including the crops ready to be harvested but lost in 1997 due to the lack of transportation. The indirect losses due to the impossibility of the first sowing in 1998, was estimated at US$441.2 million. The total damage to the sector reached an estimated US$996 million.

Health

In Ecuador, several diseases have been associated with El Niño periods: V. cholerae, Campylobacter, C. botulinum, E. coli, Salmonella, Shigella, Hepatitis A, Malaria, Dengue, Leptospirosis, Leishmaniasis, Encephalitis, among others. There were four epidemic problems during the last El Niño (1997-98): cholera, leptospirosis, dengue and malaria. Each outbreak was enhanced by El Niño. However, the number of cholera cases during the 1991-92 event was 17 times those of 1997-98, indicating that the magnitude of an event is cause for its potential impact upon a disease. One reason for this dramatic decrease could have been the Contingency Plan of the Public Health Ministry for the prevention of epidemiological diseases, like malaria, cholera, dengue and leptospirosis. This plan had three target actions:

• Social preparation and transport;
• Control of vector-borne endemic and epidemic diseases;
• Aid to populations at the affected zones and shelters.

It is important to note that human health problems are also caused by secondary impacts. One problem of attribution comes from the fact that populations at poverty levels will always be affected, independent of the magnitude of an El Niño event, because of its higher vulnerability.

El Niño Attributions

Not all the damage reported by CEPAL⁴ and other institutions can be completely attributed to El Niño. Other underlying societal causes of the impacts include poverty, lack of education, bad and corrupt politicians, weak economical situation, among other factors, all of which need to be studied. If we did an analysis by sector, we could simplify and understand the reliability of these attributions.

Agriculture: Excess rainfall, as a result of El Niño, did affect the size of the planted areas of different crops: bananas, sugar cane, rice, and soy. Also, air temperatures and cloudiness negatively affected some fruit plants, like mango, by preventing them from flowering. Flooding occurred in the same area, causing additional destruction.

Health: In this sector, the problems were originally derived from poverty but were enhanced by El Niño. Lack of potable water, sewage treatment and drainage problems in small cities and rural communities make them good candidates for water-borne and vector-borne diseases, during even so-called normal conditions. When an El Niño event hits the country, these conditions are worsened, triggering an increase in disease. Prevention measurements depend on economic and human resources available from the Ministry of Health.

Fisheries: El Niño directly affects this sector. The decrease in sardine fisheries and other small pelagic fish populations is due to an increase in ocean temperatures which caused them to migrate southward looking for cooler conditions. The rate of recovery of these fisheries is not fast. Some fisheries are positively affected, e.g., the shrimp and dolphin (magi magi) fisheries. Also, the activities of artisanal fishermen declined because of the higher surface wave activity during El Niño.

Infrastructure: The maintenance of public infrastructure, such as highways, secondary roads and bridges, was not done properly during 1996. This was due to the presidential campaign and, in the earlier part of 1997, due to the country's political situation. Also, there are a lot of problems related to road construction, such as noncompliance with the regulations required for heavy rainfall episodes during a normal rainy season. Roads in Ecuador are not built to last. Therefore, the damage to public infrastructure is mainly due to poor construction and maintenance, and should not be attributed solely to El Niño. In relation to private infrastructure, especially housing, the problems are due to a lack of any "territorial order" (i.e., zoning regulation and/or enforcement). People living in rural zones, or urban margins, do not take into account whether they are on a river's flood plain, an unstable hillside, a dry river bed in a flooding area, etc., when they build their houses. Also, they do not use good materials for their construction. Therefore, most of the damage to the infrastructure should not be attributed to El Niño.

Responses to Information

Responses varied; those from the public sector (e.g., government) were markedly different than those from the private sector. The government established a unit under presidential control (COPEFEN) to coordinate all actions needed to mitigate the expected impacts of the event. However, this was largely ineffective because this organization did not take into account the organizational structure of the country in the case of a disaster. National Civil Defense should have been the agency in charge.

The response of the private sector was fast, and largely more effective, because it is better organized under national and provincial chambers by sector, and especially because they were aware of the potential impacts of El Niño on each sector. However, we can identify several strengths and weaknesses in the responses of both sectors to the El Niño impact scenarios that were provided.

Strengths

• Timeliness in request for aid: good timing and the ability to request international funds for coping with disasters
• Higher education level and organization level in the economic sector: allowing the economic sector to better assimilate climate information and information about impacts on its activities.
• Prior knowledge of some of the expected impacts: this would have helped in the allocation of aid.

Weaknesses

• Difficulty in forecasting the duration and magnitude of the event: only maps of regional and of some local impacts could be provided, using the 1982-83 event as a plausible worst-case scenario.
• Lack of credibility: this may be because of the lack of a "forecasting culture" within the country and misinformation.
• Lack of organization: within the weakest socio-economic sectors, a lack of organization made them unable to react as a group.
• Lack of funds: access to even small amounts of money deterred the implementation of mitigation plans.
• Information unavailable to all: information received about The El Niño event was not always in a suitable and understandable from the perspective of potential users of such information. There were some exceptions, such as efforts directed by local and regional organizations, which went area by area to explain the potential impacts.
• Political problems: political instability was at a high level.

Lessons Learned

If a perfect forecast would have been available as early as October 1996, knowing what is known now about the actual impact that did take place in Ecuador, the responses could have been different, especially in the private sector and in the education sector. For example, the school year in the coastal provinces runs from April-May to December-January. Given a perfect forecast, there would have been enough time for developing an educational campaign at the high school level that could have had a positive impact mainly on the urban population.

Government responses might also have been different because there was, at the time, a president from the Ecuadorian coast who was running the country. In general, however, the political and socio-economic situations of the country are the ones that most influence any possible response to an El Niño event. There are some lessons to be learned from an analysis of the socio-economic and political settings during the 1997-98 El Niño, of its impacts and the country's responses. These lessons must be taken into account before the impacts of the next event plague the country.

The lessons summarized below are not in order of importance. Several of these lessons, drawn from the project's Brief Executive Summary Report prepared for the Millennium UN General Assembly, were considered applicable to the Ecuadorian country case study.

• The condition of the country's infrastructure at the time of the El Niño event has a lot to do with the severity of impacts on the infrastructure of that event.
• Political and socio-economic conditions such as poverty and conflicts during an El Niño will have a major effect on how adverse the impacts will be.
• Existing political and socio-economic (and military, as on the occasion of Ecuador's border war with Peru during the 1997-98 event) problems will have to be dealt with by the government at the same time that it is forced to cope with a forecast of El Niño's onset or of its impacts.
• The globalization of news releases (e.g., media coverage about El Niño's impacts elsewhere on the globe) heightens the concern of the public about possible impacts in their own country.
• In times of El Niño-related disasters in Ecuador, it is imperative that rivaling government agencies and ministries work together. They should be expected to follow the pre-established chain of command – the National Civil Defense in the case of Ecuador – which is better prepared to cope with disasters than any other government agency acting alone.
• There are positive as well as negative impacts of El Niño within Ecuador (e.g., the shrimp industry), but the positive effects are often either overlooked or downplayed as to their importance.
• The flow of information about El Niño (not just forecasts) to rural areas must be improved in order to make El Niño forecasts and research usable by the public living in these at-risk areas.
• Radio is an important channel of communication about El Niño (e.g., early warning and development) and its related impacts to the poorer segments of the population.
• Governments must be educated about the importance of weather and climate information, not only for effective disaster response but for economic and sustainable development purposes as well. In other words, there is a need to overcome the lack of a "weather/climate information culture."
• To include an explicit consideration of El Niño in a national disaster plan for Ecuador would be only part of the solution. Another part is to provide sufficient funding to implement the El Niño-related aspects of the plan. Yet another part is to create awareness of the phenomenon.
• There is a need to identify a reliable source (or sources) of El Niño information, including forecasts, in order to avoid confusion in the government about conflicting forecasts of a possible El Niño event.
• The impacts of previous El Niño events must be reviewed in order to gain a better perspective on the range of potential impacts on society and of possible societal response strategies. Prior knowledge of El Niño impacts in Ecuador can help to better target some of the at-risk groups.
• International funds need to be available in a timely way, so that governments at various levels can take pro-active measures in anticipation of the impacts of an El Niño event.
• There is a need for a forecast with more reliable information about the magnitude and the duration of an El Niño. This requires international financial support for research on other aspects of the ENSO cycle, and just for research on the onset of El Niño.

1. ERFEN studies the physics of El Niño and its impacts on fisheries and other biological resources of the region. This program is part of the Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur (CPPS), or the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, that was created in 1975. CPPS is a regional program with Peru, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador as members.
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2. Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Evaluación de los efectos socio-económicos del fenómeno de El Niño en 1997-1998. Ecuador, 1998: p.37-41.
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3. There is no IPP for 1997 or for the regional level available, so the IPP at the national level for 1998 is used.
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4. CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe), 1998. Ecuador: Evaluación de los efectos socio-económicos del fenómeno de El Niño en 1997-1998. Santiago, Chile: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 37-41.
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